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ABSTRACT 
The emphasis of this research is to leverage Knowledge Flow Theory to enhance extant 
Decision Theory and decision support systems to improve the decision-making process in 
military organizations in general and to outline a research agenda for subsequent 
application to the Hellenic Navy. Thus, the challenge of this research effort is to expose 
the major factors that define the problem of the decision maker for correct decisions 
through their synthesis.  
The areas of the dynamic knowledge as well as the mental models have special 
gravity among the military personnel since they determine the decision making process. 
Therefore, the intention of the author will be to conduct an introduction of the existed 
literature and provide greater fidelity and insight into the mechanism within which the 
emerging technology can either support or in some cases improve our decisions. Hence, 
the basis of this thesis is to enlighten the technological approach for timely integrated 
decisions.  
The method that will be followed focuses on theoretical integration and is 
expected to result in a general decision-making process for the military that reflects 
explicit incorporation of Knowledge Flow Theory. 
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One of the most enduring lessons derived from the history of warfare is the degree 
to which fog and friction permeate the battlespace. The fog of battle is about the 
uncertainty associated with what is going on, while the friction of war is about the 
difficulty in translating the commander’s intent into actions. Much of the fog of war, or 
what is referred to today as a lack of battlespace awareness, has resulted in the inability to 
tap into collective knowledge, or the ability to assemble existing information, reconcile 
differences, and construct a common picture. There needs to be equal emphasis placed 
upon developing a current awareness of both friendly and enemy dispositions and 
capabilities, and in many cases, there needs to be increased emphasis on neutrals 
(Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000). 
The modern era, which is known as the Information Age, has created an 
environment where collaborative decision-making can be employed to increase combat 
power. This is partly because of the emergence of coalition operations, partly because of 
the distribution of awareness and knowledge in the battlespace, and partly because of the 
compression of decision timelines. This alone would be challenging enough, but the 
Information Age has also transformed the problem of warfare from a series of static 
events to a more continuous one by greatly increasing the operating tempo of events. The 
result is the need for greater integration between the heretofore separate planning and 
execution processes, which requires more timely interactions between the two, and 
portends an ultimate merging of these two processes into a seamless form of command 
and control. 
Therefore, the Information Age has changed the way one reaches decisions, 
allocates decision responsibilities within the organization, develops options and evaluates 
them, and the manner in which one chooses among them. This has obvious implications 
in how one designs systems and trains people, which becomes the necessity for more in-
depth analysis for their causes.  
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During the last decades, scientists have started enlightening the domain of human 
knowledge. Additionally, their research has driven them to produce mental models that 
attempt to explain the mechanism that analyzes and synthesizes the components of that 
knowledge in order to exploit the results for improving the decision making process.  
The technological evolution of the Information Age affects decisions, discovering 
or generating new areas to invest in, and requiring more knowledge that develops a self-
reinforcing cycle of research. To this end, it is also true that the continuous race for more 
knowledge that decreases the uncertainty, subsequently forces people to rely even more 
on the technology that provides better, faster and cheaper solutions for the proper 
management of the received information.   
One of the most frequently leveled criticisms, by those who think that the 
“creature” will never be able to substitute for or even worse overpass its “creator,” is that 
the reliance on information technologies (IT) (sensors, data processing, communications 
subsystems.) carries an inherent weakness that opponents can exploit—the vulnerability 
of such technologies to offensive information warfare, or “hacking.”  
Do information technologies carry an electronic Achilles' heel that opponents can 
exploit? Are people losing the control of their inventions? If so, heavy reliance on the 
system-of-systems, which is the current goal of the military (and not only) technology for 
integrated solutions, might make the user vulnerable to catastrophic failure in efforts to 
use it successfully in conflict. 
There is great danger in relying on military systems that have exploitable flaws. 
Indeed, the characteristic that gives any system its potency for enhanced effectiveness 
due to their complexity also makes some systems susceptible to catastrophic failure if one 
of their central parts can be jeopardized.  
On the other hand, the difference between the visionary leader and the “system-of 
systems” is his unique ability to recognize, identify, and adapt his vision upon which he 
will develop his decisions that mitigate the above-mentioned risks.  
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The uniqueness of the human instinct, which is based on explicit and tacit 
knowledge, is rather difficult to be copied and reproduced by any other system (at least 
with the current technology). There are some aspects of the system-of-systems that ought 
to alleviate, if not refute, these concerns in order for the future to accelerate the decision-
making process. 
First, one needs to recognize that there is no need to wait until someone else finds 
a potential vulnerability; instead, one needs to think and work continually to find and 
eliminate it first. 
Next, one needs to eliminate the search for secured systems and start 
incorporating risk management. A race will probably always exist between those who 
seek to ensure the security of information-based systems and those who seek to overcome 
their security measures. That does not mean that one has to curse the technology for 
being vulnerable, but rather one has to educate himself/herself for the best and most 
efficient handling and managing of the systems’ abilities for his/her benefit.  
Finally, one has to appreciate the fact that the systems are tireless and can be 
replaced instantly or provide a robust redundancy that works against the possibility of 
breaking the whole system; characteristics that people cannot provide or at least it 
requires an extended amount of time, effort and resources for doing so. 
Hence, none of these weaknesses is cause for complacency; one needs to 
continually keep in mind potential vulnerabilities and work hard to find and end them. 
Neither can be assessed that a closer collaboration between man-machine in the decision-
making process carries more risk if people trust the technology than sticking with the 
current and more human-oriented status quo.  
Thus, one needs to create new (dynamic) knowledge that follows the changes of 
the operational environment and will allow for recognizing the benefits of exploiting the 
emerging technology that focuses on the cognitive domain rather than the material one. 
Furthermore, recognizing that today’s decisions are based on a plethora of information 
available to everyone at no cost requires superiority that will offer the competitive 
advantage among the opponents and the ability to appreciate the systemic pathologies of 
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the decision-making process that covers many facets. Having said that, one can value 
the efforts and the willingness for transformation of the Armed Forces to meet what the 
network centric concept dictates, in order to elevate the collaboration and the 
knowledge sharing that ameliorate and accelerate the decision making process. Therefore, 
after all these terms governing one’s daily routine, one needs to analyze each and every 
one of them in order to appreciate their gravity and significance in the military reality.  
A. THE DYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge represents a critical resource in the modern enterprise that 
conceptualizes the competitive advantage offered by the intellectual capital of an 
organization (Grant, 1996; Nissen, 2002). 
Capitalizing on this resource for enterprise performance depends upon its rapid 
and efficient transfer from one organization, location or time of application to another. 
From a technological perspective, such dynamic dependence points immediately to the 
design of information systems (IS)—along with the corresponding organization and 
process characteristics (Leavitt, 1965; Davenport, 1993)—to enhance knowledge flow. 
However, knowledge is distinct from information and data (e.g., it enables direct, 
appropriate action; see Davenport, De Long, and Beers, 1998; Teece, 1998), and few 
extant IS even address knowledge as the focus or object of flow (Nissen, 1999). 
In addition, the charisma of leadership that distinguishes the successful leader 
from the followers within an organization either in the military or in a business 
environment is a combination of skills and knowledge gained through the education and 
training that constitute the whole of his/her personality. This personality is extremely 
difficult to be copied or transferred to others without losing critical parts of it.  
Furthermore, the role that the mental models play for the decisions that one builds 
is rarely understood although these cognitive constructs not only provide a basis for 
interpreting what is currently happening, they also strongly influence how he/she acts in 
response. 
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According to Senge, “[The] mental models of what can or cannot be done in 
different management settings are no less deeply entrenched” (Senge, 1990, p. 8). 
Moreover, due to the technological revolution that occurred as a result of the 
exploitation of unlimited knowledge, the role of the IS has been upgraded, providing both 
supportive and performative means to the decision-making process that address issues at 
the time, completeness and accuracy realms (Nissen, 2006). 
These three factors have a distinguished gravity in the military environment since 
they define the results of an operation that most of the time affects the sovereignty and 
existence of a nation as a whole. 
B. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
The constantly changing nature of routinely made decisions in an organization is 
based on their involvement with the results of other interrelated decisions that were made 
in the past, or they have to be made in parallel with the current ones as a common 
practice of a higher strategic plan.  
It has been argued that in dynamic environments, outcome feedback 
acquires the property of being corrective feedback (or negative feedback 
in a cybernetic sense) in that it permits adjustments. Decision makers can, 
therefore, rely on outcome feedback through a judgment-action-feedback 
loop to make effective decisions. (Sengupta & Abdel-Hamid, 1993) 
Cognitive feedback is conceptualized as information provided to a decision maker 
about (a) the relations in the decision environment, (b) relations perceived by the person 
about that environment, and (c) relations between the environment and the person's 
perception (Balzer, Doherty, & O’ Connor, 1989). 
Additionally, the research shows that there are three types of information that 
correlate the environment and the decision maker:  
1. Task information, or information about the cue-criterion relationships in 
the environment;  
2. Cognitive information, or information about the cognitive system of a 
decision maker; and 
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3. Functional validity information, i.e., information about the relation of the 
cognitive system to the task system (Balzer et al. 1989).  
Therefore, every decision is a combination of interconnected factors and “players” that 
constitute the whole.  
C. THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE 
Everything and everyone are connected components of a larger web. As the great 
Argentinean author Jorge Luis Borges (1998) quotes, “There's no need to build a 
labyrinth when the entire universe is one” (p. 260). There is an interrelation of social, 
economical, religious and professional or even personal interests that connects everyone 
within a worldwide network.  Perhaps that was also the primary reason for the rapid 
success of the Internet and the World Wide Web (www) just after their first public 
introduction and literally boosted their implementation rate and performance, becoming 
part of one’s daily life. 
Today we increasingly recognize that nothing happens in isolation. Most 
events and phenomena are connected, caused by, and interacting with, a 
huge number of other pieces of a complex universal puzzle. (Barabási, 
2003, p.7)    
Indeed, the necessity for fast and reliable communication, exchange of ideas, 
information gathering, education and/or quick and accurate calculations and simulation 
models has been provided, almost in total, by the Internet, thus drastically reducing the 
traditional ways that are characterized as isolated or “old fashioned.”   
Thus, decisions require the collaboration of many different partners, reducing the 
characterization of leaders as “great men” that used to be given in the past and rather 
introducing the term “leader” as designer.  
Leaders who appreciate organizations as living systems approach design 
work differently. They realize that they can create organizational artifacts 
like new metrics, or formal roles and processes, or intranet web sites, or 
innovative meetings- but it is what happens when people use the artifacts 
or processes or participate in the meetings that matters. (Senge, 1990)  
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These “leaving systems,” according to Senge, demand the conquest of knowledge 
that comes through the information superiority in order to achieve better and faster 
decisions.  
D. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
Deterrence, power projection, and other strategic concepts are greatly affected by 
the ability to influence the perceptions and decision making of others. Thus, frequent, 
instant, and reliable access to information available inside and outside the operational 
area (ensuring the uninterrupted collection, processing and dissemination of that 
information) is required. These information infrastructures could inhibit a commander’s 
ability to control the flow of information or dynamically manage available information 
while denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. 
In addition, the same factors are also crucial in the business world, since they 
provide the means for achieving the required competitive advantage within the market 
arenas that will boost a company to become leader in its field. At the same time, they 
provide the analogous “competitive advantage” among services or between adversaries. 
In both cases (i.e., the military and the business word), the environment is highly 
dynamic and most of the time uncertain and unpredictable relative to the results of a 
decision that a commander/manager is called on to make for addressing a certain 
situation. This became the genesis of the network-centric concept, in an effort to decrease 
the uncertainty through the instant dissemination of information that allows for the 
creation of integrated decisions. 
E. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
Rapidly advancing information-based technologies combined with the 
increasingly competitive global environment have thrust information into the center stage 
in society, government, and warfare in the 21st century. Information and information-




deployment, sustainment, post-conflict, and redeployment processes to the plethora of 
forces and weapons systems employed by JFCs (Joint Force Commanders) and their 
component commanders (JP 3-13). 
The predominance of the technological evolution on the information superiority 
arena against the knowledge and skills that are required from the end user in order to 
operate effectively is perfectly illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Emerging Information Operations and Technology (From JP 3-13, p. I–16) 
What might be misleading is that the end user will not be the generator or the 
originator of the information-based technology, but only the one who exploits its 
capabilities. Thus, the necessity for more knowledge as technology evolves is even bigger 




F. THE MOTIVATION 
Following all the above-mentioned concepts like dynamic knowledge, the reliance 
on the information technology and the relevant risks, the decision-making process and the 
information superiority that governs it, and the network-centric concept, were some of the 
challenges that the author was confronted with. This became the motivation for his thesis 
research -in order to expose the major factors that define the problem of the decision 
maker for correct decisions through their synthesis as a whole following the concept that 
Fritjof Capra introduces in his book “The Web of Life,” stating that “…the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts” (Capra, 1996, p. 31). 
In a similar approach, Dr. Abdel-Hamid argues in his book “Thinking in Circles 
About Obesity” that:  
The great shock of twentieth-century science has been that systems cannot 
be understood by analysis… The performance of any system (whether it is 
an oil refinery, an economy, or the human body) obviously depends on the 
performance of its parts, but a system’s performance is never equal to the 
sum of the actions of its parts taken separately. Rather, it is a function of 
their interactions (Ackoff, 1994). These interactions (and their properties) 
are destroyed when the system is dissected, either physically or 
theoretically, into isolated elements. Breaking a system into its component 
pieces and studying the pieces separately is, thus, usually an inadequate 
way to understand the whole. (Abdel-Hamid, 2009, p. 27)  
That is the reason for the decision making process to be addressed as a “system”, 
meaning the “…integrated whole whose essential properties arise from the relationships 
between its parts…in fact the meaning of the word “system” ….derives from the Greek 
synistamai (“to place together”)” (Capra, 1996, p. 27). 
This same concept also explains the reason why viable solutions are the ones that 
are sustainable on the realm of time without transferring or producing new problems for 
the future.     
The above-mentioned simplified approach of a human being to his/her problems 
is based on the misleading notion of his/her linear nature that follows the instinctive 
attempt to analyze everything that occurs to its components. What is rather difficult to 
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understand from the beginning is that most of the time the same components that are 
connected either differently or at different analogy can produce numerous different 
results. For example two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen under the influence of 
temperature can produce gas, water, melted ice, ice, and perhaps many other results with 
different characteristics and behaviors.    
Therefore, there are no simple or single answers to people’s problems since today 
people have moved from the simplicity of living to the complexity of operating under a 
dynamic environment, which is the challenge of this thesis research. The question that the 
author will try to answer is as follows: “How can, an understanding of dynamic 
knowledge, be leveraged to improve the military decision-making process?” In order to 
achieve that, the thesis will follow a structure that consists of five chapters.  
G. THESIS LAYOUT 
The first chapter provides an overview of the thesis’ problem domain and an 
introduction of dynamic knowledge, drawing upon the existing literature. Sequentially, 
the second chapter builds a rich multidimensional representation of dynamic knowledge 
under the prism of decision theory, demonstrating potential implementation of the 
emerging technology that is borrowed from the existed literature. Continuing with the 
third chapter the author analyzes the decision-making pathologies and synthesizes the 
proposed interventions that address those problems. In the following chapter the author 
discusses the results that occur from the synthesis of the gathered information, providing 
an experimental approach that is intended to offer greater fidelity and insight into the 
decision-making process, borrowed from the MIO (Maritime Interdiction Operations) 
experience of the NMIOTC-GR (NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training 
Center-Crete, Greece). Finally, this research effort ends with conclusions that provide an 
agenda for continued research along the lines of this work. 
Therefore, the author will follow the path of knowledge that starts from a signal 
that is being received, and that signal constitutes data that is processed to become 
information. Then, this information will be further analyzed and with the exploitation of 
the already existing explicit and/or knowledge tacit will generate new knowledge. 
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Finally, this new concept will be the basis for innovations, problem solutions and actions 
in general that will affect performance. Thus, the decisions that have to be made at each 
stage of knowledge will determine the quality and quantity of the final product.  
H. THE EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION FROM THE RESEARCH 
The existing literature dictates that knowledge management and mental models 
are two areas of extreme research interest, since the implementation of IS technology on 
them has a significant gravity on the modern military (and not only) environment. 
There is no shortage of exaggerated claims, unfounded criticisms, and just plain 
misinformation about this subject. Sorting out fact from fancy will be among the author’s 
tasks as he struggles with how to apply network-centric concepts (a relatively new idea) 
to military operations.  
Since the successful adoption of the network-centric warfare (NCW) requires a 
cultural change, it cannot be achieved without widespread discussion, debate, 
experimentation, and ultimately, broad acceptance. If this effort stimulates and 
contributes to this process, it will have achieved its intended effect. 
Modern armies move through this (NCW) direction that underlines the synergy 
and self-synchronization that is required between knowledge, mental models and 
Information technology.  Therefore, it is a rather new research field that gathers a lot of 
interest not only because of its sensitive nature of understanding but also because of its 
wide implementation especially from the decision making perspective.   
The method that will be followed focuses on theoretical integration and is 
expected to result in a general decision-making process for the military that reflects 
explicit incorporation of knowledge flow theory. 
Further, this thesis research seeks to enrich the poorly understood dynamic 
phenomenon of the knowledge flow process, which facilitates mental models that 
materialize the implementation of IS technology for the sake of the improvement of the 
decision-making process.  
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Thus, the intended result is the maximization of efficient knowledge flow through 
the  exploitation of emerging technologies that requires resident knowledge in order to 
succeed, while the successful transfer of usable knowledge is the genesis of this research, 
within the framework of the decision making process.  
It is not within the intention of this enterprise to underestimate the gravity that the 
human mentality has to that process, but rather to appreciate how the technology can 
support human beings for the sake of response time, completeness and accuracy that is 
required for every one of the decisions that an officer in command is called to take.  
The author will try to present an approach to the variables that determine the 
complexity of the decision-making problem in addition to the principles of the leadership 
that govern the mental process of such decisions.  
Moreover, this thesis research will attempt to provide the required scientifically 
supported information about the pathologies of knowledge, how can be managed, 
proposing interventions that address them, emphasizing the complexity and difficulty of a 
decision-making process.    
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II. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER 
A. KNOWLEDGE IS POWER 
Force has no place, where there is need of skill 
(Herodotus, “The Histories of Herodotus”) 
From the fossil and archaeological record, there is good evidence that most of 
human history was marked by an incredibly negligible growth of knowledge. Even in 
historical times, whole centuries passed with few advances in knowledge. That changed a 
few hundred years ago starting with the Renaissance, and knowledge has been increasing 
since then at an accelerating rate. Recently, machines implemented the techniques of 
trained microbiologists, computers processed the data to identify valid hypotheses, and 
other computer programs automatically documented the results (Hayes-Roth, 2006). 
Therefore, in this chapter the author discusses knowledge management, providing 
some basic theory upon the path of knowledge (data-information-knowledge) and how 
the dynamic complexity of the military environment and the uncertainty add more 
complication to the decision makers. In addition, the author tries to underline the question 
whether technology participates as a major enabler or a minor contributor to the decision-
making process, presenting some means and methods that are used for the improvement 
of the knowledge flow. 
B. WORK SMARTER RATHER THAN HARDER 
In a complex and rapidly evolving environment the optimum results of one’s 
efforts come when one works smarter rather than harder. In other words, the way that 
people produce, develop or operate is not any more a function of their hard work to 
accomplish more tasks, because the plethora of data and information exceeds their ability 
to understand and absorb the amount of knowledge that is required. Thus, people need to 
focus their efforts on improving the process of handling and managing existing 
knowledge and generating knowledge for their benefit.  
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To this end, people need to understand the differences between the data that is 
dispersed everywhere––in their daily activities, working environment, nature, etc. ––the 
information that requires certain skills and previously gained knowledge in order to be 
appropriately processed, and the generation of new knowledge that comes as a result of  
education, training and experience.  
The difficulty is that there are not unique definitions of the terms although their 
meanings are similar. As Table 1 shows, there is a variety of expressions that address the 
same terms but from different perspectives according to the interest of the scholar.  




Facts and messages Data vested with 
meaning 
Justified, true beliefs 
Davenport & 
Prusak (1998) 
A set of discrete facts A message meant 






Nissen (2006) Data are operationalized 
best as interpreted 





best as providing 
meaning and 
context for action. 
Knowledge is 
operationalized best as 
enabling direct action 
Nonaka &  
Takeuchi 
(1995) 








Text that does not 
answer questions to a 
particular problem 
Text that answers 
the questions who, 
when, what or 
where 
Text that answers the 
questions who, when, 




Not yet interpreted 
symbols 
Data with meaning The ability to assign 
meaning 
Wiig (1993) - Facts organized to 
describe a situation 
or condition 





know how   
Table 1.   Definitions of Data-information-knowledge (After Stenmark, 2002) 
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Moreover, there are different schools of thoughts that support either the clear 
distinction between data, information and knowledge (Nissen, 2006) or the argument that 
due to the difficulty of the clear separation of the terms there is a “continuum” of the 
three (Davenport & Prusak, 1997). 
However, Nissen, Davenport, and Prusak agree that there is close interrelation 
between data, information, and knowledge. Drawing from Nissen (2006), one notionally 
structures the knowledge hierarchy as triangle-shaped using two dimensions—abundance 
and actionability. Data lie at the bottom level with information in the middle and 
knowledge at the top. The broad base of the triangle represents the abundance that 
exponentially decreases with the move from data to knowledge. On the other hand, the 
height of the triangle reflects the actionability (i.e., one’s ability to take direct action) 
which increases with the move from data to knowledge. 
 
Figure 2.   Knowledge hierarchy or the path of knowledge (From Nissen et al., 2000)  
C. THE PATH OF KNOWLEDGE (DATA-INFORMATION-KNOWLEDGE) 
1. Data 
Data is the plural of datum, which in Latin according to the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary (2003) means, “factual information … used as a basis for reasoning or 
 16
interference” (p. 316). Other dictionaries or information technology sources present 
similar descriptions of the word as was discussed earlier on. Thus, data is something 
really basic that does not provide any obvious benefit to the user unless it is processed; it 
is like a word out of context. 
For example, the numbers 20, 5, 10, 2, and 2 are meaningless unless they 
participate within a context. Then, they can have many different interpretations when 
they enhance the meaning or provide comparison measures to the factors that constitute 
the parameters of a hypothesis (scenario). These different interpretations are ruled by the 
environment within which the hypothesis is built. Different kinds of knowledge (e.g., 
language, experience) are required for different kinds of actions (e.g., interpretation, 
informing) related to the knowledge hierarchy (data-information-knowledge) (Nissen, 
2006). Therefore, if that environment was the planning of a naval operation then, these 
numbers could gain some context (meaning) that translates the simple data into 
information. This “translation” requires the personal involvement of the user (his/her 
understanding and experience) in order to become processed material that can be further 
developed to generate knowledge. According to Dr. Nissen, “…the message recipient can 
interpret the signals (i.e., for data) and ascribe meaning (for information) to the message 
but cannot take action (for knowledge) without additional knowledge” (Nissen, 2006, p. 
18).  However, before getting to that point one needs to understand that the pieces of the 
collected data may represent information depending on the understanding of the one 
perceiving the data.  
Therefore, in order for the data to be exploitable information, it requires some 
processing that will select the necessary elements for building one’s objectives, 
hypothesis, or scenarios; otherwise, data are useless.       
So, initially there is a need for systems that gather these data in order for the user 
to find the interrelation among them that makes sense, or in other words, that gives 
meaning to them. The IT systems that are capable of selecting and gathering data have 
certain characteristics according to their scope and specifications. Hence, a metric system 
that provides a common basis for evaluating these systems is required, and some of these 
metrics are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Representative Measures of Performance (MOPs) for a Military Command 
and Control System (From Waltz, 1998) 
According to the description of each one of the metrics, one can understand the 
significance that the probability and uncertainty have on every aspect of technology and 
how critical it is for their outcome to minimize these factors for the level of quality and 
quantity of the process that produces information. 
2. Information 
Information is more than just data from which it is derived. Through processing, 
data is placed in a context, related to other data or previous information, and developed 
into something that is consumable by its users. Thus, the data transferred through  
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intelligence, social networks, or other communication links is still raw material since it 
has not been processed or developed, in order to be evaluated and then handled as 
information.  
Therefore, continuing with the author’s case of the planning of an offensive naval 
operation, the meaningless numbers, 20, 5, 10, 2, and 2 receive meaning if it is known, 
for instance, that the enemy has: a) 20 major combat ships and b) 5 of them are under 
maintenance or repairs with c) an average of 10 days to be required for them to be 
operational under conditions (according to the length of their repairs), d) in addition to 2 
warships that are detached and deployed abroad, participating in an international 
commitment which requires e) at least 2 days of full-speed cruising in order to be able to 
return to their home ports. Then, one has a good estimation that for the first two days of 
operations (if the attack is started today) the enemy will have less than two-thirds of their 
ships available to fight (under certain restrictions). Moreover, if the weather forecast 
predicts clear skies on Monday and Tuesday and foggy weather for the rest of the week 
for a certain area, this is just data based on statistics and predictions that do not add any 
value to one’s objectives. However, if the Area of Operation (AOO) is that specific area 
and the decision is to start the attack on Tuesday, limiting the time for the adversary’s Air 
Force to respond, then, the significance of that information changes.  
Hence, the collection of simple facts (i.e., data), does not provide any element or 
indication of the adversaries’ readiness and operational capacity. However, if someone 
gathers all the data and has the ability (explicit and tacit knowledge) to analyze the 
situation and synthesize the “picture” behind the numbers, then one will be able to 
estimate the actual capabilities and perhaps predict the resistance that should be expected 
if one was planning to attack at a specific time. To this end, the author realizes the 
existing interrelation between data, information and knowledge, since, for the case being 
presented, one generates new knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities, which is 
produced by the proper matching of the data with their context. After the data’s 
intellectual processing (information) one “creates” a picture in his or her head about the 
current operational status of the enemy (knowledge), which is a result of one’s education-
training-experience. However, the author will analyze later on this chapter the principles 
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of knowledge in order to encapsulate the interrelation and how data, information, and 
knowledge complement one another. Thus, for the moment, the author will maintain the 
logical approach of understanding the relationship between data and information as it has 
already been introduced.    
From a more technical approach that also falls under the same logic concept, the 
network traffic of the communication links—due to their structure—just packages the 
data into packets. These packets will be delivered to their destination where they will 
then either be stored as (useless for the moment) data or be further developed (they will 
receive some meaning). In other words, data that is not used, meaning processed, does 
not provide any information to the user.  
The abstract nature of these concepts makes it difficult to see a clear way to 
measure the value of information, even though there are established ways to quantify and 
characterize the associated data. Often a small amount of information will have greater 
value than large amounts; thus, there is no direct relationship between the quantity of data 
and the value of the associated information. Although these two concepts are closely 
related, their relationship does not necessarily reflect their quantitative analogy.  
For this reason, it would be a mistake to use purely communication metrics (such 
as throughput and bandwidth) to analyze information operations and evaluate their 
performance. 
a. What Is the Value of the Information? 
Moreover, in the military environment where command and control are 
required for the orchestration of all operations, the efforts to reduce the uncertainty at a 
reasonable point (elimination of uncertainty would be a utopia) dictates the gathering of 
useful information, generating knowledge derived from the triad of education, training, 
and experience.  
Therefore, the need to design cost-effective information protection 
architectures adds new urgency to this classic problem. The biggest mistake system 
evaluators can do is equate information and data and evaluate the information warfare 
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performance of systems from a purely data communications perspective. Within the 
context of overall information operations, a bandwidth-efficient distributed system 
transmitting a smaller number of bits is very likely to be a better system than one that 
dumps large amounts of raw data on its users. The reason being is that the information is 
an understanding of the relationships between data or between data and other 
information, and the addition of unnecessary data does not add any value to the already 
existing knowledge, which is the requirement for all one’s efforts. Especially when one is 
dealing with the dynamic complexity that characterizes the majority of the military 
operations, the notion of valued information plays a significant role for the successful 
outcome of a mission. 
b. “Dynamic Complexity”  
According to Naval Doctrine Publication 6 (NDP-6) that discusses 
command and control principles, gathering information increases the commander’s 
understanding of the situation but it will never remove all the uncertainty (NDP-6, p. 12). 
Thus, sometimes the pursuit of more information can lead the commander to be confused 
or misled. As Clausewitz (1984) said, “…a great part of the information obtained in war 
is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is uncertain” (p. 
75). 
As knowledge about a situation increases, the ability to make an 
appropriate decision also increases. Knowledge is a function of information. Davenport 
and Prusak (1997) argue that 
Knowledge is information with the most value and is consequently the 
hardest form to manage. It is valuable precisely because somebody has 
given the information context, meaning, a particular interpretation; 
somebody has reflected on the knowledge, added their own wisdom to it, 
and considered its larger implications...the term also implies synthesis of 
multiple sources of information over time. (p. 9)  
Hence, as the quantity of information increases the effectiveness of the 
decision also should increase. At some point in the process, however, when basic 
knowledge has been gained and the quest for information focuses more on filling in 
 21
details, a point of diminishing returns is reached. At this point, the potential value of the 
decision does not increase in proportion to the information gained or the time and effort 
expended to obtain it. As the amount of information increases to this certain point, 
knowledge is increasing and the time needed to make an effective decision is decreasing. 
Beyond this point, additional information may have the opposite effect. It may only serve 
to cloud the situation, impede understanding, and cause the commander to take more time 
to reach the same decision he or she could have reached with less information, simply 
because he or she consumes precious time on analyzing useless or unnecessary 
information for the current mission.  
Today’s emerging technology enables commanders and their staffs to 
access in near-real-time extended amounts of information relating to every aspect of the 
current operational environment. This provides an integrated recognized operational 
picture (either in the maritime, land, or air domains) that covers the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the 
decisions of the commander. Hence, information will be available for matters related to 
friendly, neutral, and enemy forces and the civilian populace. In addition, the commander 
will be able to plan, organize, and execute his or her plans while maintaining an equally 
large volume of information concerning weather, terrain, cultural influences, and other 
aspects of the operational environment. This mass of information, when subjected to an 
analytical process, can be distilled into intelligence to support a predictive estimate of 
adversary capabilities and intentions. Consequently, this intelligence will become gained 
knowledge (for the commander) about the mentality and the strategy that the adversaries 
have and execute. 
If not managed properly, sensors and information systems can overwhelm 
the commander with more information than he or she can process and understand in time 
to make decisions. It is the current level of the commander’s knowledge that will allow 
him or her to clarify the value of the data and the gravity of the information that is 
required to generate new knowledge, improving the decision-making process according 
to the mission’s objectives. Thus, the failure of technology to produce dramatic  
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improvements in the decision-making process, when the amount of information increases, 
is caused by the “dynamic complexity” that Peter Senge introduces in his “Fifth 
discipline.”  
When the same action has dramatically different effects in the short run 
and the long, there is dynamic complexity.  When an action has one set of 
consequences locally and a very different set of consequences in another 
part of the system, there is dynamic complexity.  When obvious 
interventions produce non obvious consequences, there is dynamic 
complexity. (Senge, 1990, p. 71) 
c. The Uncertainty of Military Operations 
In the already dynamic and complex military environment, uncertainty 
adds more complication to the decision maker pervading in all military operations. This 
ambiguity covers the unknown factors that affect a commander’s estimation about the 
adversary and his intentions, about the environment, or even about his or her own forces. 
Nevertheless, the nature of combat will always make absolute certainty impossible to 
attain. It is important to understand that certainty is a function of knowledge and not of 
information. The two are clearly related, but the distinction is that important information 
is the raw material from which knowledge is generated. Knowledge results from people 
adding meaning to information through the process of cognition when they match 
patterns that already exist with the processed new information generating something new. 
Such an integration of people, doctrine, technology, and information 
allows a commander to gain situational awareness, reach decisions about courses of 
action, and implement those decisions by means of plans and orders. Hence, the 
command and control system encompasses not only the equipment and technology that 
support its mission, but also the leadership, training, organization, and doctrine that guide 
it.  
Although there is no single way that information can be evaluated—
simply because each of the recipients has a different understanding and different 
background to receive the appropriate message that the information hides—there is no 
doubt that information has context and a value basis. Therefore, this value is derived from 
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the efforts and the required resources (people, infrastructure, budget, etc.) for gathering 
that information, or the significance that it offers to the current operations, which 
accelerates the results for the sake of the objectives.  
d. How Does Information Add Value? 
The value of the information is a function of the user, the user’s intentions, 
what others intend to do with it, and the expected and/or actual outcomes. In addition, as 
the author has already mentioned, value depends also on other factors such as resources. 
Therefore, knowledge cannot be derived without the understanding of how valuable 
information matches with the available resources in order to achieve objectives. 
Consider the following example of a computer software evaluation as it 
has been adopted from Dr. Myron L. Cramer.  
The source code for this software would carry great value to a competitor 
who could use it to gain insights into program design and techniques. It 
would have almost no value to someone who lacked the ability or 
resources to compile the program, and who only had use for the 
executable code. To a third person also lacking the software development 
capability but without ethical restraints of the second person, the source 
code might have value based on its marketability to competitors of the 
developer. (Cramer, 2005) 
Thus, it is now clearly understood that information without other 
components cannot be fully exploitable unless it has been further processed and 
correlated with the appropriate factors. The emerging technology that the modern IT 
systems provide offers solutions that accelerate the performance and support processes in 
order to achieve higher effectiveness and efficiency. 
Therefore, a certain number of metrics that characterize the capacity and 
capabilities of these systems helps retrieve the figure of merit that technology can add to 
processes for better, faster and more accurate information that sequentially can generate 
new knowledge, which supports the final objectives.  
A representative table with the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of a 
military command and control system that handles information is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3.   Representative Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for a Military Command 
and Control System (From Waltz, 1998) 
Like in data collection systems, the “uncertainty principles” also affect 
outcomes since there are many reasons why it is difficult to achieve precision when 
dealing with information. Therefore, in the information realm one has to deal with some 
level of acceptable approximations. The reason being is that there will always be some 
amount of uncertainty that will be proportional to the information’s time window and the 
associated information bandwidth within this timeframe. Although one may be able to 
calculate different factors that influence the information, it is difficult to tabulate 
statistical data on something in cyberspace; it is too intangible.  
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e. The Sensitivity of Information 
Since information is sensitive and crucial for the successful outcome of 
operations it needs to be properly handled and protected. 
(1)  Access and Security Principles.  According to the Certified 
Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) publication, “Access is the flow of 
information between a subject and an object. A subject is an active entity that requests 
access to an object or the data within an object” (Harris, 2008, p.155). Thus, the control 
of the access provides the ability to monitor, protect and manage the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information.  
It is time to define these characteristics that determine the value of 
information. “Confidentiality is the assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, programs, or processes” (Harris, 2008, p. 157). Hence, some of 
the mechanisms that assure the confidentiality of information are the encryption, logical 
and physical access controls as well as control traffic flows. To this end, sensitive 
information (like enemy capabilities, potential courses of action or movements of forces, 
etc.) that needs to be exchanged between component commanders requires the utility of 
encrypted environment (Internet Protocol security (IPSec)) encryption protocol) that 
virtual private networks (VPNs) and the like offer.  
Integrity characterizes the information that is accurate, complete 
and protected from unauthorized modifications. Therefore, any illegitimate alteration of 
the context or the sender/receiver details violates the reliability and thus, the value of the 
information. A control mechanism that assures (with some limited notion of risk) the 
integrity of the transmitted information is the electronic signature. According to U.S. law, 
an electronic signature is “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or  
logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person 
with the intent to sign the record” (U.S. Public Law 106–229, 2000). More depth on this 
subject is out of the scope of the research project. 
Finally, the availability of information means that information has 
to be available to users in a timely manner. Fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms can 
assure the uninterrupted availability of resources that allow for the continuation of 
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operations. Commanders use these concepts within their planning process to develop 
strategic or executable plans according to their objectives, realizing the significance of 
the protected information. 
(2)  Information Assets.  The mission or the strategic vision 
communicates the purpose of the military structure to the staff. The individual processes 
utilize technologies and facilities, which are operated by knowledgeable staff and are 
supported by the organization’s databases. Information assets are integrated into all of 
these in different ways; the value and risks to these information resources are different. 
 
Table 4.   Information Assets (From Cramer, 2005) 
3. Knowledge 
The concepts of “center of gravity” and economic warfare have been employed 
throughout military history.  Controlling information (in a time effective manner) and 
manipulating perceptions at the crucial point in a campaign have always been desirable, 
but may have been technologically difficult to achieve. Perhaps now there is that 
capability and it must be known how to plan campaigns using these concepts supported 
 27
by technology in both offensive and defensive roles. There is a need to properly manage 
knowledge in order to make better, faster and more integrated decisions. 
Thus, there is a need to recognize the patterns that exist between processed 
information. These patterns embody both a consistency and completeness of relations 
which, to an extent, create their own context. In addition, they serve as “archetypes,” 
according to Peter Senge, with the characteristics of repeatability and predictability 
(Senge, 1990). Hence, the pattern relation between data and information can represent 
knowledge only when one is able to recognize and identify these patterns and their 
implications, enabling direct actions. Therefore, the relationship amidst data-information 
that meets a certain pattern creates its own context, which represents knowledge only 
when it is understood by the interpreter who acts accordingly.   
To this end, the commander must meet objectives to accomplish a mission. 
Therefore, he or she needs to interpret the “right pattern” in order to gain the required 
knowledge. There will be obstacles in the path that must be overcome (enemies, etc.) and 
he or she can either go through them or around them.  At the risk of oversimplifying the 
situation, physical weapons offer many options for going through an obstacle and 
information "weapons" offer options for going around.  One must realize, however, 
that neither information weapons nor physical weapons work alone! 
Only when they work together (each filling in the voids where the other cannot be 
used for physical, political, financial, or other reasons), can they truly strengthen the 
commander's ability to efficiently and effectively reach mission objectives. 
Basically the commander wants to take the best of Clausewitz1 and the best of 
Sun Tzu2 and combine them into an effective strategy. Whether he or she works at a 
strategic, operational, or tactical level, he is always targeting cognition (cognitive 
domain) through the manipulation of information (information domain) to cause the 
                                                 
1 Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz (1780 - 1831) was a Prussian soldier and German military 
theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His most notable work, Vom Kriege (On War), 
was unfinished at his time of death. 
2 Sun Tzu (722–481 BC) was an ancient Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher who is 
traditionally believed, and who is most likely, to have authored the Art of War, an influential ancient 
Chinese book on military strategy. 
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adversary to take desired actions (physical domain.) From this statement, one can see that 
information is the weapon, cognition is the target, and actions are the desired effect. 
This is how knowledge is created and implemented. Thus, to fully appreciate the 
power of knowledge people need to understand how information, in any form, affects the 
way they interact with the environment. Whether the information is a true representation 
of the environment, a partial truth or outright falsehood is irrelevant. The simple fact that 
someone receives the information will shape how that person views the situation and 
subsequently how he or she acts or reacts to his or her environment (i.e., information 
drives decisions.) In other words, it is how one understands what is going on, and 
according to one’s experience (tacit knowledge) and  education-training (explicit 
knowledge), how one reacts to every trigger.   
In the seminal work “Public Opinion,” Walter Lippmann identifies the 
fundamental principles upon which all influence and information operations are based:  
The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not 
experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of the event.   
Whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it were the 
environment itself.  When we look closely at our day-to-day lives we 
discover that there if very little that happens in the world that we 
personally experience. (Lippman, 1921)  
A person’s knowledge of what is happening outside of his or her “onboard 
sensors” comes from second-hand sources.  Whether it is a friend relating their 
experiences, a Facebook posting, a Tweet or a newscast, people are receiving distorted 
information about events in their world. Whereas Lippmann’s work is anecdotal in nature 
and focuses on how the information one receives shapes his or her knowledge and 
attitudes, it also provides an excellent approach on how a person’s experiences (tacit) and 
information shapes his or her behavior. 
Tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994) is deeply rooted in action, commitment, and 
involvement in a specific context, while explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that is 
transmittable in a formal, systematic language. There is an abundance of explicit 
knowledge in the military context such as published general plans and doctrines or other 
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publications. There is an equal abundance of tacit knowledge within the same context. 
Developers of information systems obtain tacit knowledge by socializing and 
internalizing the actions and experiences that they share with militarists and industrialists 
of the military market. Nissen’s Vertical and Horizontal Processes Model characterizes 
the powerful interaction between the flow of work and the flow of knowledge in an 
enterprise (Nissen, 2002b).  
 
Figure 3.   Vertical and Horizontal Process Model (From Nissen, 2002b)  
The horizontal, sequential process represents the flow of work, and the vertical 
process represents the flow of knowledge through time and space. Nissen’s dynamic 
knowledge-flow model conveys the interdependencies of information processing 
requirements between some tasks in different workflow processes. It assumes that 
vertical knowledge flow only occurs at the end of a horizontal process and is independent 
of other workflow processes. However, Nonaka’s dynamic theory of organizational 
knowledge creation posits that knowledge-flow processes—transformation of tacit 
knowledge to explicit knowledge—occur through socialization, internalization, 
externalization, and a combination within the individuals of the development team with 
others, both internal and external, of the organization (Nonaka, 1994).  
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The author views the transformation of learning into knowledge as a core activity 
that ultimately results in value embedded in processes that produces results and 
demonstrates a fundamental connection between learning, knowledge and value. After 
all, it is not the final destination that gives value to the effort, but the whole process of the 
trip to reach one’s goals.   The promise of the Information Age has largely been based on 
the assumption that current employee knowledge could be redeployed within info-
systems and networks to reduce the cost of knowledge use within core processes. Thus, 
the race for reaching the technological edge that will allow for better, faster and more 
efficient results has already started. Unfortunately, most of these projects in practice 
implement information technology (IT) applications such as databases, search engines, 
and Web portals when attempting to support knowledge management. However, the 
majority of these applications include the words data or information within their titles; 
thus, they work at a level that is lower that knowledge, although they are called 
“knowledge management tools” (Nissen, 2006). Therefore, there is a need to be 
extremely careful when discussing applications that enhance the flow of knowledge.   
D. AGENT-BASED SIMULATION TECHNOLOGY 
In today’s dynamically unstable environment, the amount of pressure put on 
government and public service organizations (like the Department of Defense) for 
maximum performance at the minimum cost is enormous. In order to address these 
challenges, governments must leverage technology in a way that maximizes efficiency, 
transparency, and audibility, while providing real-time access to vital 
information. “Exploiting the benefits of IT, it can be argued that … technologies 
automate some activities within workflows but not all of them. The people in an 
organization perform most workflow roles requiring knowledge-particularly those 
involving experience, judgment [decision making] and like capabilities depend upon tacit 
knowledge. This leaves IT to largely systematic, clerical, and procedural roles, for which 
requisite knowledge can be formalized explicitly” (Nissen, 2006, p. 50). 
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In an effort to analyze the above statement related to processes, it can also be 
argued that IT systems provide cost-cutting measures, streamline processes, and thereby 
reduce deficits. The current technological implementations improve crisis response, 
ensuring that decisions/actions are delivered in a fast and efficient manner.  
Supporting this challenging management and learning task is motivation to 
employ agent-based simulation technology to model and analyze the development 
process, and thereby seek to improve project performance through enhanced owner-
design-construction coordination. Further, such new technology can support the dynamic 
process of knowledge creation and flow among temporary stakeholders (every participant 
with an active interest on the project) who do not belong to the project sponsor’s 
organization, but whose combined decisions during the entitlements-feasibility phase 
impact the facility’s overall implementation time and cost. Currently, essential 
knowledge often remains clumped within specific stakeholders and organizations, as 
explicit mechanisms such as design specifications and building documents have yet to be 
developed in this early phase. Thus, the challenges of managing facility development also 
include organizational learning, which is not understood well in the military domain. 
Moreover, people are rationally bounded and limited in their individual and 
collective abilities to share such knowledge through current means, such as 
conversations, documents, diagrams, and others.  
Nearly all contemporary information systems, instead of addressing the flow of 
knowledge, are focused on the transfer of information and data, which are qualitatively 
different across numerous dimensions (Davenport et al., 1998; Teece, 1998). 
Furthermore, the few theoretical knowledge-flow models that are currently available 
(Dixon, 2000; Nonaka, 1994) have not yet been developed to a point where they can 
effectively inform the design of information systems and business processes to enable, 
automate and support knowledge flow in the enterprise. The current practice shows that 
such system and process design is accomplished principally by trial and error, which is 
one of the least-effective design approaches known (Nissen, 2002b). Thus, it is a matter 
of risk management that needs to be adopted in order to facilitate the benefits of 
technology with minimum vulnerabilities. 
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E. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Many of the technical efficiencies that make the U.S. so dominant in battle have 
also made the U.S. very dependent upon their availability, and the disruption of these 
systems, many of them fully automated, could profoundly degrade combat capabilities. In 
this respect, information technology is a double-edged sword and one has to proceed 
carefully. That said, despite the risks it is believed that the benefits are quite great. 
Risk is an inherent part of every process, making risk management a vital issue 
for every organization.  By mapping processes with risks and controls, one gets an 
accurate picture of how an organization operates and how these operations must be 
improved. Improperly assigned controls and unanticipated risks arise when an 
organization has a poor understanding of their processes. Thus, a decision-making 
approach of whether IT in a process enables or transforms is extremely important for the 
survivability of the process. 
Therefore, one has to identify the scope of the process and its gravity to the 
organization’s structure. “Processes that are responsible for the organization (taxonomies, 
ontologies), the formalization (storing, codifying) and sharing (distribution) of 
knowledge use the supportive role of the technology focusing on the speed, fidelity and 
accuracy that an IT system offers as an enabler” (Nissen, 2006, p. 53). Additionally, 
processes that cover the application (decision-making), refinement (evolution), and 
creativity exploit the performative role of technology that enhances changes and 
transforms the working culture.  
Therefore, the standardization and consistency of the process that IT provides 
make it even more tempting. Expert systems technologies (simulation modules) simulate 
changes to resources and support the effort to avoid costly mistakes by effectively 
controlling resources. Furthermore, technology provides the supportive means for 
automatic documentation that ensures the repository of knowledge (key for innovations) 
and analyzes the processes into logical, small-related steps that set specific goals for 
achievement. It also provides flexibility and removes redundancies, thus decreasing the 
time and complexity of actions.  
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In addition, the performative attributes of IT improve the efficiency and increase 
the effectiveness of the standard operating procedures by modeling and managing 
strategies (improved crisis response). Moreover, they formalize rules and policies that 
influence working behavior and performance. The appropriate technological applications 
connect government rules to processes, which creates embedded controls within 
processes, ensures the highest level of governance and compliance highlights potential 
risks associated with each task, maximizes risk avoidance, and implements standard 
methodologies. 
F. TECHNOLOGY AS A MAJOR ENABLER OR MINOR CONTRIBUTOR 
OF PROCESSING 
Hence, when the process provides only services, then the IT implementation 
supports the development of this process, offering easy to use solutions that address 
issues of “what to do” by enforcing the automation, sequential evolution, monitoring, and 
integration of multifaceted components. On the other hand, when the procedure requires 
or contains some learning process then the contribution of IT is quite limited for the 
amelioration of the performance (Nissen, 2006).  
Therefore, it is important to identify whether the IT implementation enables or 
transforms a process. Within the military environment where timely response (time), 
justifiable investments (money) and intellectual capital (people) are three of the pillars of 
its structure for successful evolution, IT involvement plays a crucial role in accelerating 
the processes (time) and improving the performance (people) at the lower cost (money).     
Therefore, a certain number of metrics that characterize the figure of merit of 
these systems that act as major enabler of knowledge management within a military 
organization is required in order to evaluate them. A representative table with the utility 
metrics of a military command and control system is seen in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   Representative Utility Metrics for a Military Command and Control system 
(From Waltz, 1998) 
Along these same lines, many of the existing tools/systems offer infrastructure 
support for knowledge work and enhance the environment in which knowledge artifacts 
are created and managed, but the flow of knowledge itself remains almost indirect. For 
example, information systems are widely noted as helpful in the virtual office 
environment (e.g., when geographically-dispersed knowledge workers must collaborate 
remotely), or by providing networked tools such as shared, indexed and replicated 
document databases and discussion threads (e.g., Lotus Notes/Domino applications). 
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These tools serve to mitigate collaboration losses that can arise when rich, face-to-face 
joint work is not practical or feasible. However, supporting (even rich and remote) 
communication is not sufficient to guarantee knowledge flow (Nissen, 2002b). The 
construction and use of knowledge-based systems (KBS) can make knowledge explicit, 
and thus easier to be transferred within an organization and its application direct, which 
ensures return on the investment. 
G. KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS (KBS) 
These technologies include applications such as: expert systems and intelligent 
agents, infrastructure and support tools (e.g., ontologies, inference engines, search 
algorithms, list and logic programming languages), and a variety of representational 
formalisms (e.g., rules, frames, scripts, cases, models, semantic networks). 
Hence, KBS are predicated on the capture, formalization and application of the 
core knowledge domain. The use of KBS for knowledge flow within organizations is well 
known, widespread, and now the subject of textbook applications (Russell & Norvig, 
1995; Turban & Aronson, 2001). 
The advantage that KBS offer is that they are knowledge itself—not just 
information or data—and they are designed to interpret and apply represented knowledge 
directly. These capabilities and features make KBS distinct from most classes of IT 
applications presently employed for knowledge management (Nissen, 2002b). However, 
expert system development—through classic knowledge engineering—requires explicit 
capture and formalization of tacit knowledge possessed by experts. This is just the kind 
of tacit knowledge that has long been known as being "hard to capture." 
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III. THINK-PROCESS-DECIDE-THINK AGAIN 
The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is 
comprehensible. 
(Albert Einstein) 
This chapter provides some basic elements of systems thinking theory, 
approaching the general idea of mental models and their influence upon the decision-
making process. In addition, the author attempts to present some insights on how and 
what information technology (IT) can do for the support of the decision-making process, 
which provides some interesting approaches from the military domain.  
A. SYSTEMS THINKING THEORY 
The review of literature presented that besides the required synergy among the 
components of a network, feedback and causal loops are key systems thinking concepts 
or building blocks that follow certain patterns (representative samples) already existing in 
people’s minds. Peter Senge (1990) believes that “Systems’ thinking is a conceptual 
framework, a body of knowledge and tools that has been developed over the past fifty 
years, to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to change them 
effectively” (p. 7).  
Hence, within that framework, Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), a large-
scale networking initiative, provides an ideal context for studying since it covers the 
dynamic behavior of the environment and its participants in addition to the network 
topology of the system. 
According to John Sterman (2000): 
If people had a holistic worldview, it is argued, they would then act in 
consonance with the long-term best interests of the system as a whole, 
identify the high leverage points in systems, and avoid policy resistance. 
(p. 4) 
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Most human/societal systems are nonlinear feedback systems; therefore, since 
people are concerned with the behavior of complex systems, system dynamics is 
grounded in the theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback controls.  
B. AN ACTION LEADS TO REACTION   
In the conflict domain of a complex environment, the reciprocal influence 
between actor and adversary cannot be overstated. Every action engenders a reaction. As 
one actor acts to alter the state of the system, others may react to restore the balance that 
was upset, maintaining the dynamic behavior of the whole. Yet, the heuristics one uses to 
judge causal relations lead systematically to cognitive maps that ignore feedbacks, 
multiple interconnections, nonlinearities, time delays, and the other elements of dynamic 
complexity (Abdel-Hamid, 2010). 
People tend to use linear––or open-loop––thinking (according to traditional 
mental behaviors) about a problem that looks like the event/action/result sequence. An 
event generates an action that sequentially drives to some result. What people tend to 
miss at that point is the fact that these results are also events that require related actions 
with follow-on results, and this cycle never ends unless there is a drastic disturbance of 
the system that will cause the collapse or the total alteration of it.   
Each repetition of this cycle adds feedback and dynamics, often with delays. 
“Delays are a critical source of dynamics in nearly all systems. Some delays breed danger 
by creating instability and oscillation. Others provide a clearer light by filtering out 
unwanted variability, and enabling managers to separate signals from noise” (Sterman, 
2000, p. 409). 
Nonlinear behavior in general complicates the decision-making task, drawing 
different mental models and courses of action that make the involvement of emerged 
technology to processes even more demanding. To this end, the introduction of the 
network-centric concept in military operations became a rather successful approach that 
addresses the necessity for faster, better and integrated decisions. 
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C. THE DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR 
The challenges that the network-centric approach of the modern armed forces face 
today, are on how a robustly networked force will lead to improved information sharing, 
and how this improved information sharing and collaboration will result in improvements 
in both the quality of information and shared awareness (Alberts & Hayes, 2006). The 
reason is that the plethora of useless or unused information received by the commanders 
determines the state of their situational awareness, which sequentially drives them to 
make proper or false decisions.   
There is only limited experience with network-centric concepts and their 
applications. Thus, while there is a growing body of evidence that network-centric 
operations can result in dramatic improvements, there are few well-documented 
quantitative assessments. Further, this network-centric experience is limited to command 
and control approaches that are fairly traditional (Alberts & Hayes, 2006).  
Under the holistic approach of systems thinking theory, one can argue that every 
decision made or action done can never stay alone, it has to be supported by others and be 
supportive to others. Thus, in any stage of decision making (including the network-
centric environment) one needs some information (feedback) about the results that he/she 
caused based on his/her actions that will become the basis and the criteria to select his/her 
future steps.  
1. Feedback Loops 
The psychologist Powers (1973) wrote:  
Feedback is such an all-pervasive and fundamental aspect of behavior that 
it is as invisible as the air that we breathe. Quite literally it is behavior- we 
know nothing of our own behavior but the feedback effects of our own 




All dynamics arise from the interaction of just two types of feedback loops: 
positive or re-enforcing and negative or balancing loops as shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Positive/Negative Feedback Loops (From Senge, 1990) 
Positive loops are self-reinforcing (or amplified), meaning that with the 
interrelation between two agents (entities that are mutually dependent) an initial change is 
amplified, producing further change in the same direction.  
Negative loops are balancing (or self-correcting), meaning that the interrelation 
between two agents result in the counteraction that opposes the change. Negative 
feedback loops are different in that they counter and oppose change.  
All systems, no matter how complex, consist of networks of positive and negative 
feedbacks, and all dynamics arise from the interaction of these loops with one another.  
Thus, the cognitive nature of feedback loops correlates the entity with the 
environment that the decision was made in (for example, what is the level of acceptance 
of the public opinion concerning the scope of the tasks that are included within the MIO 
framework), or the entity with the scope (i.e., how the MIO commander perceives the 
reactions of public opinion relative to the MIO activities). Finally, there is the 
combination of the above, meaning the correlation between the acceptability level of the 
scope of the mission by the entity in comparison with the acceptability level of public 






In a similar way as feedback loops, causal loops capture the dependency of the 
agents that constitute the system under change because of an external (or internal) cause. 
Thus, when the feedback loops connect the entity with the results of his/her actions that 
will determine his/her future decisions, the causal loops get into the causality of that 
result, distinguishing the correlation among the agents (feedback loop) with the reasoning 
that drove to a specific behavior, attributes, etc. According to J.D. Sterman (2000):  
Correlations among variables reflect the past behavior of the system … do 
not represent the structure of the system…causal diagrams must include 
only those relationships you believe capture the underline causal structure 
of the system. (p. 141) 
Hence, it is interesting to examine how these concepts are met in the military 
domain. Investigators in various fields ranging from psychology to organizational design 
have noticed that adaptive systems must evolve into more complicated and differentiated 
structures as they grow in size and operate in increasingly complex environments 
(Barabasi, 2003). The current profile of military operations fulfills the complexity criteria 
since it has been largely expanded, covering areas that are far away from the traditional 
military tasks like peacekeeping operations or humanitarian aid and natural disaster relief.  
Like in most of the typical organizations that operate in a complex environment, 
militaries use a hierarchical system structure with a relatively small number of 
components to produce a wide variety of different tasks. In a hierarchy, the highest 
members usually worry about big issues, drawing the lines of the strategic vision while 
the mid-level managers or commanders in the military “format” take responsibility for 
particular functions or important sub-goals that their subordinates will undertake in order 
to serve and support the objectives of the above-mentioned strategic vision (Hayes-Roth, 
2006).  
For example, while the government and the chiefs of the services under the 
supervision of the Joint Chief of Staff set the lines of the national strategy, including 
offensive and defensive goals in addition to armament procurements, the commanders, as 
mid-level decision-makers, take responsibility for determining how to defend a particular 
installation, capture a key target, or defeat an enemy unit. At the lowest level of this 
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organization, individuals, machines, or small ensembles interact with the environment 
directly and apply resources to transform orders into results that follow the strategic 
vision’s framework.   
The hierarchy works both top-down and bottom-up with the military following a 
combination of the two models. In top-down mode, high–level mission objectives 
translate into tactics and tasks and ultimately into operations. In bottom-up mode, units 
measure and report their results, interpretations and lessons learned to superiors, and this 
process repeats up the levels producing an adaptive decision loop (Hayes-Roth, 2006).   
Thus, instead of the traditionally used Boyd’s OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act) loop (Figure 5a) that emphasizes four principle steps in adaptive behavior (observe 
the environment, get oriented towards important factors, decide what to do, and act 
accordingly), now scholars and managers (including commanders) move to the adaptive 
decision loop (Figure 5b). This approach requires changing future behavior for achieving 
better outcomes by reducing differences between the actual results and the initially stated 
goals.   
                       5a                                                                              5b  
Figure 5.    (a) ODDA Loop; (b) Adaptive Decision Loop (From Hayes-Roth, 2006) 
Additionally, the commander is an integral part of the command and control 
system and not just a user of it, and as part of his/her duties has to manage the available 
information in a timely manner and participating actively in the whole process. 
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D. TIME IS PRECIOUS  
In military operations, time is a precious commodity for three reasons. As one 
gathers more information in an effort to increase his/her situational awareness (his/her 
knowledge of the current status and its potential), previously collected information may 
become obsolete. Additionally, the time that one spends preparing for his/her mission 
against his/her adversaries, according to the current stage, may alter their plans and 
change the situation in the process. Finally, the rapid tempo of modern operations forces 
commanders to make and change decisions based on limited––and sometimes confusing–
–information emphasizing the race against time. A commander, therefore, must ensure 
that his/her decision making and execution are swift or at least swifter than those of 
his/her adversary. Thus, the commander has to address the “principal questions for every 
delay” that J.D Sterman (2000) introduces: “What is the average length of the delay? 
What is the distribution of the output around the average delay time?” (p. 412). 
E. POORLY PERFORMED DECISION LOOPS 
Reality dictates that actual decision loops usually are poorly performing 
concerning how far the results are from the goals (Hayes-Roth, 2006). The reasons are 
many, but the author will try to enumerate some of them below. 
a) Decision makers receive imperfect, error-prone, incomplete and inconsistent 
information. There is an unofficial race between the services concerning their 
effectiveness and professionalism that sometimes makes them not share their information 
or knowledge of a subject, or when they do they share it they do so partially in order to 
underline their superiority against the others. On the other hand, in an effort to avoid a 
potential “penalty” caused by fudged data, they hide their material. Moreover, some time 
people with low-credibility information “characterize” it as precious in order to gain 
temporary personal benefits within the organization.    
b) Decision makers do not immediately understand situations accurately and are 
usually very slow to correctly identify little deviations from the scope that drastically  
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affect the final result. Dissimilar people “translate” differently the same things since they 
have different educational backgrounds and/or experiences that determine their level of 
knowledge. 
c) Decision makers take a long time to decide how to intervene, and then they 
usually guess. Most high-level decision makers are distant from the actual battlespace, so 
the information they receive is aggregated, abstracted, filtered and distorted. Most 
organizations do not collectively create and operate a comprehensive model of the 
environment due to the complex and rapid changeability. The personnel chosen to staff 
rapid-reaction task forces consider some factors ignore some details, and guess, or put 
more eloquently, try to decide some remedies that would work best.   
d) People asked to implement changes rarely understand their tasks and roles 
perfectly. Instructions usually leave out details under the assumption that the receivers 
will fill in the missing details in a predictable way. In addition, many tasks and contexts 
in real life are different than ones extensively planned for and practiced. As a result, 
requesters usually do not specify tasks adequately, and people receiving tasks have 
difficulty fully appreciating the nuances of the challenging situations handed to them. 
Since there is a huge range of possible results between what an organization 
actually accomplishes compared to the initially stated goals, any competitor (adversary) 
that operates decision loops faster, errorless,  and with better (more completed) 
knowledge, more effective communication and more reliable “translation” of goals into 
actions will gain the competitive advantages that determine the winner of that race.   
F. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE DECISION MAKERS IN THE MILITARY 
The military environment reveals a dynamic organizational structure that varies 
across different developmental life cycle phases. It is believed that the dynamic nature of 
this organizational structure can cause knowledge flow breakdown despite the sequential 
work processes involved (Hayes-Roth, 2006). The author also posits that the high 
interdependency of tasks in concurrent workflow processes compound such a breakdown. 
There are also many interdependencies between workflow processes in a military 
operation. For example, the tactical commander plans with his or her staff and execute 
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the planning according to his or her operational objectives. At the same time, the supply 
officers are dealing with the logistics and the overall infrastructure of the enterprise, and 
the meteo officers (officers responsible for the weather forecast that will affect the 
operational tempo) provide all the data for the prediction of the environment that supports 
the goals of the tasks. Thus, there is a need to know how people working in teams make 
decisions since almost all military operations require the synergy of different services, 
agencies or people (staff).  
For most of the domains, teams are involved, like a helicopter pilot working with 
a navigator or other helicopter, a navigation officer working with the navigation team of a 
ship during the berthing process, etc. Thus, the successful ending of any complicated 
operation will be based on integrated planning that requires the collaboration of many 
other participants apart from the tactical commander.  
G. THE ART OF WAR 
The synergistic and multifaceted nature of military operations is enhanced by high 
uncertainty because despite the sequentially developed activity schedule, each 
development phase and execution is unique and distinctive, which requires information 
processing that most of the time cannot be completed. 
In addition, conflict termination is determined by humans; humans who must 
somehow have been persuaded to change their minds about the possibilities of success 
for their cause. This is where warfare in the information domain meets warfare in the 
physical domain. For example, if armed forces want someone to abandon his/her course 
of action in favor of their course of action, they have two options: kill him/her or 
convince him/her! The true art of war comes in balancing these two to reach our 
objective.  
The research shows that people draw on a large set of abilities that are sources of 
power. The conventional sources of power include deductive logical thinking, analysis of 
probabilities, and statistical methods. However, the sources of power that are needed in 
natural settings are usually not analytical at all, like the power of intuition, mental 
simulation, metaphor and storytelling (Klein, 1998). The power of intuition enables 
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someone to size up a situation quickly. The power of mental simulation lets someone 
imagine how a course of action might be carried out. It is how someone “builds” the final 
picture of his/her thoughts to be. The power of metaphor lets one draw on his/her 
experiences by suggesting parallels between the current situation and something else 
he/she has come across. The power of storytelling helps a person consolidate his/her 
experiences to make them available in the future, either to him/her or to others (Nissen, 
2006). These areas have not been well analyzed by the scholars yet. 
Most of the scholars like to study people under pressure relating to time. They 
have studied chess players under blitz conditions, where the average move was made in 
six seconds (Klein, 1998). When a component commander makes a poor decision in the 
battlespace, lives can be lost. Scholars are interested in experienced decision makers 
since only those who know something about the domain would usually be making high 
stakes choices. Furthermore, people see experience as a basis for the sources of power 
they want to understand. They want to know how people carry on even when faced with 
uncertainty because of inadequate information that may be missing, ambiguous, or 
unreliable––either because of errors in transmission or deception by an adversary.  
Sometimes when one has to make difficult choices, he/she does not fully 
understand what he/she wants to accomplish. For instance, when fighter pilots are taking 
off for the interception of unknown radar contacts that have violated national Airspace, 
they never know the intentions of their targets; thus, they do not know if their mission 
will end with an actual air battle or a simple recognition procedure. With an ill-defined 
goal, one is never sure if the decision was right (Klein, 1998). Most tasks are performed 
within a larger context that includes higher level goals and different tasks with their own 
requirements, and this must be taken into consideration. Context also includes 
background conditions, such as noise, poor lighting, constant interruptions, and other 
stressors that increase the complexity of the decision-making framework. 
H. “TA PANTA RHEI (EVERYTHING FLOWS)” (HERACLITUS) 
Dynamic conditions (i.e., a changing situation) are an important feature since new 
information may be received or old information invalidated, and the goals can become 
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radically transformed. Navy commanders, for example, may have to adapt their decisions 
for a certain simple task many times per incident. Some changes might be minor and 
require slight modifications of the decisions, while others might be major and require a 
shift in the way the commanders understand the situation.  
Therefore, one has to identify the following scale of knowledge situations in 
decision problems that determine the way that he/she decides and acts accordingly 
(Hansson, 1994): 
• Certainty - deterministic knowledge 
• Risk - complete probabilistic knowledge 
• Uncertainty - partial probabilistic knowledge 
• Ignorance - no probabilistic knowledge 
It is common to divide decisions into these categories, i.e., decisions "under risk," 
"under uncertainty," etc. In summary, the standard representation of a decision consists 
of: (1) a utility matrix and (2) some information about to which degree the various states 
of nature in that matrix are supposed to obtain. Hence, in the case of decision making 
under risk, the standard representation includes a probability assignment to each of the 
states of nature (i.e., to each column in the matrix). 
Quite often people tend to choose the first reasonable action they consider. 
However, in dealing with an adversary who might anticipate one’s tendencies, this 
strategy can get the person in trouble. It leads a person to take typical and therefore 
predictable actions (Klein, 1998). For example, during anti-submarine warfare exercises 
between surface ships and submarines, a successful tactic will be for the anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) officers of the ships to think how a submariner would think about his/her 
actions. Perhaps, geological anomalies of the depth or old shipwrecks might be 
interesting positions for a submarine to hide since they offer recognized and expected 
coverage by the surface ship crew’s sound echoes. The concept is that a strategy can be 
predictable only against an adversary who actively tries to make predictions and looks 
ahead. One of the hallmarks of experts is their ability to project current states into the 
future. The dilemma is that unfortunately most officers will not put themselves in the 
position of their adversary, but if someone is unlucky enough to come across one who 
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does, like Alexander the Great and others, then his/her recognitional decision making 
may get him/her in trouble. In other words, the recognition-primed decision (RPD) 
strategy is still an accurate description of what people do, but it has this drawback in 
adversarial situations that call for deception and not typical predictable actions (Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986).  
Skilled commanders have developed an ability to recognize when their courses of 
action are too obvious. During the evaluation of a plan by mental simulation, the skilled 
commanders will use a sense of predictability to notice that the adversary can easily 
anticipate their moves, and they will take the necessary precautions. That characteristic is 
based on the mental model that these commanders have developed through the years of 
education, training and experience; it’s a combination of learning and talent.  
I. MENTAL MODELS 
Mental models are representations of reality that people use to understand specific 
phenomena. Peter Senge (1990) describes them as follows:  
Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even 
pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how 
we take action. (p. 8)  
Quite often, new insights fail to get put into practice because they conflict with 
deeply held internal images of how the world works, which are images that limit 
someone to familiar ways of thinking and deciding. While interacting with the 
environment, with others, and with the artifacts of technology, people formulate internal, 
mental models of themselves and of the things with which they are interacting. These 
models provide predictive and explanatory power for understanding the interaction. 
Mental models are so powerful in affecting what one does simply because they 
affect what he/she sees. It is well accepted that two people with different backgrounds 
(i.e., mental models) can observe the same event and describe it differently because their 
“centers of gravity” were different according to what they thought to be more important. 
As psychologists say, people observe selectively (Senge, 1990).  
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Since people often remain unaware of their mental models, they remain 
unexamined and therefore unchanged. As the world changes, the gap widens between 
mental models and reality, leading to increasingly counterproductive actions. 
Each organization needs to develop its capacity to elevate and test the mental 
models that dominate its decisions. Therefore, in order to address that challenge, there are 
three facets that are suggested according to P.M. Senge (1990):  
a) Tools that promote personal awareness and reflective skills; b) 
“Infrastructures” that try to institutionalize regular practice with mental 
models; and c) A culture that promotes inquiry and challenging our 
thinking. (p. 171)   
The traditional authoritarian organization of the military structure follows the 
dogma of managing, organizing and controlling, where the new dogma requires vision, 
values and mental models. Together, openness and merit embody a deep belief that 
decision-making processes can be transformed if people become more able to surface and 
discuss productively their different ways of looking at the challenges of today. Of course 
that approach confronts many objections among the members of military society due to 
the fact that information and details about an operation are distributed differently at the 
many levels of the military hierarchy, requiring discipline and task acceptance for the 
sake of the mission.  
MIT’s expert Chris Argyris believes that teams and organizations trap themselves 
in “defensive routines” that insulate their mental models from examination. 
Consequently, one develops “skilled incompetence,” which is a great oxymoron to 
describe being “highly skillful at protecting ourselves from pain and threat posed by 
learning situations,” but because one fails to learn he/she remains incompetent at 
producing the results he/she really wants (Argyris, 1995, p. 22). 
The ancient Greek philosopher Socrates, and more recently Chris Argyris, both 
use the obstetrics method, which is called “maieftiki.” This method, combined with the 
use of irony, was characteristic of Socratic teaching. Under this method, Socrates in 
discussions was pretending to have complete ignorance on the subject discussed at a time, 
and through questions was trying to elicit the truth from the interlocutor. Essentially, 
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Socrates was assuming the role of consciousness and through this process of questions 
and answers was creating a culture of dialogue in the debate. The interlocutor then 
replying to these questions and was coming to a conclusion, the “truth” according to 
Socrates. The method is known as obstetric because the midwife (profession of Fainareti, 
mother of Socrates) brings the world an infant, and so Socrates or the interlocutor who 
takes the role of conscience withdraw from the interlocutor of the truth. 
Thus, this method can be used for showing one that all he/she ever had are 
assumptions, and never “truths,” that he/she always sees the world through his/her mental 
models and that the mental models are always incomplete, and, especially in Western 
culture, chronically “non-systemic” (Senge, 1990, p. 185). Therefore, one needs to 
develop skills that assist him/her on building and maintaining his/her mental models.    
1. Developing Skills of Reflection and Inquiry Skills  
Skills of reflection concern the slowing down of one’s thinking processes so that 
he/she can become more aware of how he/she forms his/her mental models and the ways 
they influence his/her actions. Inquiry skills concern how one operates in face-to-face 
interactions with others, especially in dealing with complex and conflicting issues like 
those in military operations.    
The core of the discipline of mental models consists of the following 
characteristics:  
a) Facing up to distinctions between what people say and what they actually 
do;  
b) Recognizing their “habit” of jumping from observation to generalization;  
c) Articulating what the people normally do not say during a discussion with 
others; and 
d) Balancing inquiry and advocacy, which are the characteristics of 
charismatic leaders (Senge, 1990). 
Since the most crucial mental models in any organization are those shared by key 
decision makers like commanders, it is essential to work with them in order to improve 
them. Those models, if unexamined, limit an organization’s quality and quantity of 
actions to what it is familiar and comfortable with, making all the decisions predictable 
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and common. Additionally, the commanders ought to develop reflective skills and face-
to-face learning skills in order to actively participate in the decisions and actions to be 
made, or else they will be incapable of being in charge of them. The commander’s belief 
is actually his/her mental model that drives his/her way of thinking and understanding the 
received information or determining his/her situational awareness.   
Systems thinking is equally important to working with mental models effectively. 
The payoff from integrating systems thinking and mental models will not only be 
improving of what one thinks but altering his/her way of thinking from models 
dominated by events to models that recognize changes and their underlying structures. 
Just as “linear thinking” dominates most mental models used for critical decisions today, 
the future will force one to make decisions based on shared understandings of 
interrelationships and patterns of change. Thus, the necessity for supportive technology is 
imminent due to the complexity and dynamics of the environment.   
J. DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Before a decision-making support system can be designed to best optimize 
human-machine interaction, the problem must be analyzed to determine the nature of the 
human interactions both from an ecological perspective as well as a user’s perspective. 
The external work environment, namely the system ecology, must be deconstructed and 
analyzed before the cognitive constraints can be effectively understood and incorporated 
into a design. To this end, the cognitive work analysis (CWA) approach has been 
developed to provide cognitive systems engineers with a framework for analysis that 
identifies not only the user’s goals and constraints, but also the impact of the constraints 
of the environment (Vicente, 1999).  
According to this methodology there are five phases of analysis: work domain 
analysis, control task analysis, analysis of effective strategies, analysis of social and 
organizational factors, and identification of worker competencies. Emphasizing the 
primary importance of the environment, the CWA is a tool for understanding how people 
interact in a particular domain, constraints of both the domain and worker, and tools 
required in such environments. The end result should be a product in which not only 
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workers’ interactions are understood, but also one in which process relationships relevant 
to supervisory control and decision making are revealed. Therefore, the same 
methodology can be applied to process control decision support systems in causal 
domains as well as intentional domains, including military command and control systems 
(Burns, Bryant, & Chalmers, 2000).  
Intentional domains are human-activity based, as opposed to process control-
based, and the goals of intentional systems are organizationally driven and not 
constrained by the laws of nature. Intentional domains are characterized by time 
pressured, dynamic problems with a high interdependency of human decisions, which are 
exactly the characteristics of the majority of military operations that require decisions to 
be made by commanders. 
 
Figure 6.   An Ecological Interface for Counter Insurgency Analysis (From Lintern, 
2006) 
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Figure 6 above represents the synthesis of all the appropriate instant data that a 
decision maker needs when in battlespace in order to maintain the most updated 
situational awareness that offers the most integrated information for making a decision.  
1. Basic Principles  
Therefore, understanding the principles will help those using mental models 
effectively while designing software applications. Some of these principles are the 
following: 
1. Simplicity. It is important to keep the design simple to engage and 
encourage the user to perform a task. For example, according to the 
system model (designer), an error message would appear as “Error: C5.” 
Will the user understand this? In most cases, the user probably will not 
understand this error message. This message should be written as: “There 
was an error on the printer. Please try again.” This message is simpler and 
ensures that the user understands. 
2. Familiarity. The user must be able to relate the task being performed to a 
real-world scenario. The use of mental models that the user already 
associates from his/her real-world experience allows him/her to get started 
quickly and make progress immediately. Labels should not be confusing. 
People often use the term “folder,” which is from their daily routine. The 
users are familiar with this metaphor, resulting in easier and effective 
interaction with the system. 
3. Availability. Just like in the real world, it is important for an interface to 
provide visual cues, either automatically or on request. For instance, the 
user must not be given the chance to search for files or folders. It should 
be available for every step of the task being performed. 
4. Safety. The interface should allow a user to easily recover from errors. It 
is important for him/her to feel confident while performing a task. For 
example, a user who pays his/her bills online is extremely cautious. 
During payment, if the page that verifies his/her payment amount is 
missing, he/she is going to be confused. This confusion happens because 
in reality people can verify the amount being paid just by cross-checking. 
5. Flexibility. An interface should support alternative actions that the user 
can perform during a task. That is, the user should be able to perform the 
same task in any sequence. It is important to allow him/her to recognize 
that there are alternative methods. For example, if the user wants to 
contact a company online, the system image should allow him/her to 
perform this task either by contacting the company via a toll-free number 
or through messages from a secure messaging centre available via a 
website. This is important as the user will feel safe while performing a 
task, just as he/she will in reality. 
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6. Feedback. Meaningful feedback at every step is important to strengthen a 
user’s mental model. This should also be a continuous process. People use 
checklists while they shop for groceries, while they do assignments, or 
even while they track their expenditures. Along the same lines, providing 
a checklist while navigating not only allows the user to proceed, but it also 
matches the mental model of the real world. 
7. Affordances. An affordance is a certain property of an object that allows it 
to perform an action. It is dependent on how a person perceives an object. 
An interface can have cues to afford how a task can be performed. This 
can be done by replicating real-world experiences into the interface 
design. Taking an example from people’s day-to-day-lives, they have a 
certain image of a traffic light signal. Just as the “go” signal affords 
moving forward, the “go” button affords proceeding further during 
navigation.  
Of course, there are many other factors that influence the designing process of the 
decision support systems, derived from people’s requirements and usage, thus 
experience, of the terms and systems in reality that constitute their mental model, but the 
author makes the assumption that these are the most basic ones. 
K. AN INTERESTING APPROACH 
The DoD has committed to redefine concepts of information superiority and 
network centric operations and warfare (NCOW) (Hayes-Roth, 2005). FORCEnet3, as an 
example, attempts to provide the U.S. Navy the capabilities required to support agile, 
rapid, precise, effective and efficient planning and operations. In these new concepts, 
warfighters can access and employ whatever information they need to perform their 
tasks. In short, every person should operate on the right information. One problem, 
however, is information glut. Too much information is available today, and the problem 
grows worse over time. Another problem is that people have to work hard to find the 
valuable information, either because it does not automatically find them or because it is 
                                                 
3 FORCEnet provides critical shared direction, guiding principles, and projected evolutionary 
objectives for the Navy and Marine Corps’ development of future C2 capabilities, to ensure Naval Forces 
will be ready in the future security environment. The FORCEnet function concept identifies six dimensions 
of development effort: a) physical (platforms, weapons, sensors, etc.), b) information technology 
(communications and network infrastructure), c) data (structure and protocols for information handling), d) 
cognitive (interfaces that support judgment and decision making), e) organizational (new structures and 
working relationships that will be made possible by FORCEnet), f) operating (new methods and concepts 
by which forces will accomplish missions with the new, FORCEnet-provided capabilities). 
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buried amidst megabytes of data and messages that are not important for their particular 
mission concerns. Thus, information superiority and NCOW depend on enabling each 
individual to receive valuable information at the right time and, in parallel, the automatic 
filtering out of low-value information. This requires improved means for allowing the 
needs of individuals to determine just what information finds them, so they can spend 
more of their time assessing and acting upon high-value information. This would have the 
effect of increasing individual productivity throughout the military and, as a 
consequence, help attain strategic goals. Without such a capability, or even worse, 
increasing information loads will have the paradoxical effect of reducing mission 
effectiveness. To solve these problems commanders need a model-based communication 
network (MCN) that delivers to each of its participants tailored outcomes that satisfy the 
objectives of “valued information at the right-time (VIRT)” (Hayes-Roth, 2005, p. 3). 
The basic VIRT method adapts the information flow around an understanding of 
mission plans, their rationales or justifications, the assumptions and forecasts they depend 
upon, and their expected outcomes. In short, VIRT looks for information that materially 
affects expected outcomes and communicates that to decision-makers so they can 
consider and adopt preferable alternatives in a timely way. 
Therefore, the essence of VIRT is that it knows which information handlers really 
care about what news. Suppliers of information should monitor for a change in their 
information (news) that would interest operators, because it changes their beliefs about 
expected outcomes. The final element of VIRT consists of the conveyance employed to 
transmit the valued news to the user. This should include a means to highlight news in an 
appropriate way. Preferably, highlighting causes recipients to attend to news with a 
priority that closely approximates the importance they attribute to it. Urgent and vital 
information deserves high priority. Unimportant data and stale information deserve low 
priority. One can employ a range of possible methods to implement the essence of VIRT. 
In the ideal world, the plans and plan evaluation methods of the operators might be 
known to the information suppliers. Then, whenever a supplier noticed a change in 
relevant information, it could “simulate” the operators’ thinking to determine whether the 
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operators would alter their previously selected plans. In just those cases, it would alert the 
operators. Otherwise, it would not bother to pass along insignificant changes. 
To make VIRT and model-based communication networks routinely available, 
there is a need to provide some generic capabilities that enable suppliers and consumers 
of information to understand what information is valuable. These generic capabilities can 
then be specialized for particular domains of applications and communities of practice, as 
when weather specialists and aviators establish a shared understanding of concerns such 
as “enroute icing” and “headwinds.” 
VIRT works by seeking significant events in dynamic data sources. To do this, it 
must understand what significant events undercut assumptions the plan depends on, and 
how to access and query information sources for the events of interest.  
Rather than a specific application, therefore, VIRT architecture aims to provide a 
generic service for plan monitoring and intelligent filtering of potentially relevant and 
dynamic information sources. In the generic architecture, the dependency monitor can 
infer what types of events to look for from any plan whose components include 
assumptions and a justification. The monitor can also be advised by an operator on how 
to focus or optimize its functions. VIRT also employs a registry of available information 
sources to exploit whatever sources become available. VIRT is open to new information 
suppliers who need only describe what their information sources are and how to access 
and/or query them. Lastly, the architecture is open on the question of how alerts of 
significant events should be communicated. 
L. SMART PULL-PUSH 
Systems designed to produce quality decisions, like VIRT, have many parallels 
with manufacturing systems. The key to high performance, in both cases, is to produce 
the most valued products as efficiently as possible. Value reflects the degree to which the 
products embody superior features and qualities and get to “market” promptly (Hayes-
Roth, 2006a).  
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The DoD is moving to make all information readily locatable, readable, and 
interpretable (Wolfowitz, 2004) in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the decision makers in the military domain in an effort to decrease the fog of uncertainty 
and information overload. Therefore, people need to find solutions that can simplify the 
work imposed upon a decision maker by enabling him/her to express queries in terms of 
high-level semantic concepts and domain-relevant conditions of interest (COI) and 
receive complete and valuable responses.  
The current technology is trying to develop systems where an operator will be 
able to ask for all recent reports about a specific subject and the query processor will be 
able to respond accordingly, employing much knowledge and intelligent reasoning (smart 
pull). Similarly, if an operator posts a query that is relative to his/her conditions of 
interest, the agent will be able to filter spatially and temporally relevant reports that 
provide only the useful and relevant information, thus illustrating a degree of intelligence 
(smart push) (Hayes-Roth, 2006a). 
In particular, these kinds of applications assume that suppliers of information 
learn what customers actually need to know and provide just that information to them. 
Intelligent agents, playing the role of information brokers, accept statements from 
processing entities or operators describing conditions of interest (COIs). These conditions 
describe potential events that would motivate the operators to change their planned 
actions to achieve better outcomes. As an example, consider a helicopter pilot intending 
to fly a particular route in hostile territory. During planning, the pilot plots a low-risk 
route. Subsequently, new reports about enemy sites and anti-aircraft capabilities along the 
planned route of flight would match one of the pilot’s COIs that update the risk 
assessment of the initial route, leading to the pilot changing the overall flight plan.  
In short, this new technology assumes that many processing entities have a 
continuous need to know about things that undercut their previous decisions by violating 
some assumptions on which those decisions depend. Operators engaged in real-time plan 
execution consider such information vital and urgent. Thus, smart pull-push technology 
addresses the challenge of getting high-value information quickly to operators who are 
dependent on it, identifies the required relationship among the customers of the 
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information that is provided, assures that the operators will give priority to received high-
value information, and adapts and achieves better outcomes (Hagel & Laberis, 2010). 
Therefore, this technology becomes an interesting approach that addresses the problem of 
the information overload that delays and complicates the decision-making process. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTING ON MIO 
In this chapter the author will attempt to integrate all the previously discussed 
subjects like dynamic knowledge, knowledge flow and sharing, in addition to feedback 
loops and their influence on the decision-making process, under the prism of an 
experiment. Moreover, the author will design and plan an experiment focused on the 
combination of theoretical knowledge and practical knowing of the participants. 
Therefore, the planner will present the variables, hypotheses, and criteria that, along with 
the control mechanisms and fidelity features, constitute the basic pillars of the enterprise. 
The motivating factor for this challenge was the author’s belief that learning is 
more productive when it is executed through doing, because this attitude integrates data 
exchanging that becomes meaningful information, which then in turn generates 
knowledge under the filter of the existing one. Finally, this interrelation between 
knowledge and knowing becomes the influential factor for making decisions and thus 
actions, which will drive to conclusions to be exploited for future development (Nissen, 
2006).  
A. LEARNING THROUGH DOING 
Additionally, according to Dr. Nissen (2006) “Learning refers to knowledge in 
motion. It is used most often to characterize the creation or acquisition of new 
knowledge…” (p. 78). On the other hand, “Doing refers to knowledge-based work… 
[and] … represents one kind of knowing activity” (Nissen, 2006, p. 73).  
Hence, if one would like to test and investigate the significance of his/her 
knowledge (learning) he/she needs to act (doing) according to a set of hypotheses in a 
certain environment, experimenting upon selectively manipulated variables.  
Therefore, the author will attempt to present an experimentation that shows the 
intervention and participation of information technology in knowledge sharing, and the 
improvement of the decision-making process within the MIO (Maritime Interdiction 
Operation) framework.  Moreover, this experimental effort will attempt to address the 
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issues that both the network manager (for the technical part of the experiment) and the 
MIO commander (for the tactical part) raise when they have to make decisions that are 
controversial, either due to the lack of means (equipments, participants), or due to the 
environment (weather conditions, national and legal restrictions).  
B. BACKGROUND MATERIAL 
1. Designing the Experiment 
a. What Was the Challenge?  
There are numerous similar experiments that have been planned and 
conducted for investigating either the network performance of communication schema in 
the use of exchanging and forwarding selected data under analysis or the operational 
difficulties that occur when such operations require multinational participation. However, 
none of them has dealt with the combination of these aspects, meaning the combined 
problems that both the MIO commander (at the tactical level) and the network 
management (at the technical level) confront when they operate in parallel and face the 
same situation but from a different perspective. Therefore, the challenge was to recognize 
how knowledge flows and how decisions are made when different national caveats and 
equipment variations co-exist in a mission that has to be accomplished.  
b. Hypothesis (Scenario) 
The scenario that is going to be tested consists of two groups of ships 
(either gunboat class or fast attack crafts) that are geographically dispersed for providing 
extended area coverage, but also for covering two strategic checkpoints of straits’ 
entrances. This hypothesis tests the challenges that the MIO commander faces when 
he/she has dispersed units operating simultaneously in no adjacent areas, which means 
different weather conditions, propagation environment, and different ships’ capabilities 




the fact that different nations have different national caveats while they participate in 
such operations that drastically increase the difficulty of the commander’s decision-
making process of solving a “puzzle” of diverse issues.  
At this point, whenever a chase of a suspect vessel occurs, the MIO 
commander requires maintaining direct contact with his/her involved units in action. The 
tactical problem then is that this situation creates gaps to the coverage that the rest of the 
force is called to cover by re-arranging the patrolling sectors. However, due to the limited 
number of ships that is provided for an extended area this situation becomes tactically 
problematic. In addition, if the chase requires more than two participating units then the 
problem becomes even worse. Technically, this situation creates problems to the network 
performance since one or two nodes (units) are forced to sail at the limits or sometimes 
even outside of their coverage range for their local area network (LAN) requirements. 
Then, the network manager would request to use other than the involved units to be 
positioned as relay stations. This decision drastically affects the MIO commander’s plans 
because he/she will have to decide what has the higher priority: the area coverage that 
might create gaps for illegal actions or the network performance that will provide 
uninterrupted communication and thus, feedback for further actions to be taken.   
The overall scenario becomes even more complicated when it requires the 
participation of other agencies or subject matter experts (SME) that are located far away 
from the theater of operations, requiring SATCOM capabilities and other network 
applications for achieving sufficient communication that will allow for the exchange of 
data and support the flow of information and knowledge among them.   
c. Design or Controlled Variables 
A design variable is any quantity or choice directly under the control of 
the designer of the system, and they are often bounded by constrains and feasibility 
criteria (Alberts & Hayes, 2006). In other words, design variables are a system’s 
independent variables that define the states of the processes and determine what has to be 
measured for the optimal management of the system. 
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The insecurity of wireless links, energy constraints, and the vulnerability 
of statically configured security schemes have been identified in literature as challenges 
that characterize mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) like in the case of MIOs. 
Nevertheless, the single most important feature that differentiates MANET is its dynamic 
structure and nature, which makes it difficult to be designed under the strict design 
variable context (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002).  
For the purpose of this research effort, the author will attempt to list a 
number of such variables that determine the character and the performance of the 
network. 
Design variables Description  Units  
Number of nodes  The total number of small 
boats, operating boarding 
teams, relay stations and 
NOCs participating in the 
network  
Integer number 
Clusters  The number of geographically 
dispersed MIO groups (each 
group may have 4-5 small 
boats)  that participate in the 
network  
Integer number 
Nodes/cluster The number of nodes per 
cluster 
Integer number 
Distance  The max distance between two 
nodes 
n.m  
Node’s CPU Each node’s processing 
capability according to the 
device that it carries 
MHz 
Antenna gain Each node’s antenna gain dB 
Power status Power resources for each of 
the nodes (permanent power 
supply or rechargeable 
batteries) 
External/Internal 
Remaining Power Each node’s power status Hours  
Security level The node’s security clearance Unclassified(1), 
confidential(2), restricted(3), 
secret(4) 
Packet loss Number of packets that were 
lost during traffic  
Percentage  
Average throughput Self-explanatory Bits/sec 
Link quality The quality received by the 
end user of a link 
Percentage  
Table 6.   Design Variables 
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d. Functional Constraints 
A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in order for the design to 
be feasible. In addition, constraints can reflect resource limitations, user requirements, or 
objectives set by the end user of the system (Alberts & Hayes, 2006). 
At this point, the functional constraints need to be differentiated between 
the tactical and technical levels. The former address the concerns where the MIO 
commander has certain limitations to set during the planning and execution of the 
operations that are based on the safety and security of the participants, as well as other 
restrictions and caveats set by either the individual nations among the coalition or the 
higher authority. 
The participating units need to gain the MIO commander’s trust and 
appreciation concerning their reliability on accomplishing their mission at the highest 
level of efficiency and professionalism, which is what the continuous circle of trust 
represents in Figure 7.  
 
Org 1 Res Commit 
& Collaborative 
Communication 
Org 2 Res Commit 
& Collaborative 
Communication 
Org 1 trust in Org 2
Org 2 trust in Org 1
Org 1 commitment 
to relationship with 
Org 2 
Org 2 commitment 
to relationship with 
Org 1 
 
Figure 7.   Building Trust (From Hudgens, 2008) 
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The MIO commander will be able to estimate the situation and set the 
tactical pattern of the area of operation in conjunction with the proposal set by the 
network manager, which will be focused on the optimal, and more effective, network 
structure that extends the performance of the network at the range coverage domain.  
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, security issues are always major 
constraints on any kind of operation with risk management, such as MIO, that expose 
boarding teams and ships to danger. Thus, weather conditions, common training among 
the coalition units, and standardization of equipment are some of the factors that the MIO 
commander has to properly manage in order to extract the appropriate decisions.   
Feedback loops ameliorate knowledge sharing among the network 
participants, which improve the inter-organizational performance of the MIO group for 
the sake of their mission, thus upgrading their productivity and efficiency. 
On the other hand, the dynamic nature of MIO includes potential high-
speed chasing of the suspect vessel that consequently requires the quick extension of the 
MIO mesh network for maintaining the detection process.  The result is critical 
operational constraints associated with tagging, tracking, setting up checkpoints, 
continuing standoff detection, etc. by means of mesh networking and the situational 
awareness environment.     
For the purposes of this research, the planner will emphasize the 
functional constraints that constitute quality of service (QoS) metrics (see Table 6) with 
the assumption that the user’s perception of the visible side of the QoS is the definition of 
the quality of experience (QoE). As Siller and Woods propose (2003), “.. [QoE is] the 
user’s perceived experience of what is being presented by the Application Layer, where 
the application layer acts as a user interface front-end that presents the overall result of 
the individual Quality of Services” (p. 238). 
 
 65
Functional constrains Description Units 
Bandwidth  It is a bit rate measure of 
available or consumed data 
communication resources  
Mbps 
Throughput  It is the average rate of 
successful message delivery 
over a communication 
channel 
Mbps 
Reliability  Provides properties that are 
related to the delivery of data 
to different recipients 
Percentage  
Location awareness Represents the quality of the 
provided services relative to 
the limitations that the 
location of the nodes produce 
High-Medium-Low 
Cost Self-explanatory Monetary  
Table 7.   Functional constrains 
The key performance factors, which affect throughput and coverage of a 
network, are presented below in Table 8. 
Factor Dependencies Impact 
Interference  Other devices 
occupying same 
frequency spectrum 
Impact to SNR (signal-to-noise ratio) – 
meaning the min. power difference between 




Obstacles  Increased transmission errors because of: 
• Decreased power at certain frequencies 
• The delay spread makes the received 
signal spread in the time domain 











Antenna cable length 
It is the power gain in comparison to an 
isotropic antenna measured in isotropic 
decibels (dBi). Antenna directivity increases 
antenna gain in a given direction. In client 
devices, an omni-spherical antenna is most 
suitable as it allows the device to operate in 
any position. 
 
Very important in preventing multipath 
fading, especially for increasing range. 
 
Loss in the cable depends on the length of 
the cable as cable loss degrades SNR 
significantly and should be minimized. 
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Factor Dependencies Impact 













The receiver has a minimum received power 
threshold that the received signal must have 
to achieve a certain bit rate. If the received 
signal power is lower than the threshold, the 
maximum bit rate could be decreased, 
impacting performance. Receiver sensitivity 
depends both on RF and baseband design. 
 
Higher transmit output power provides 
better performance, but is usually limited by 
regulatory requirements (e.g., FCC). 
 
Time it takes to switch between transmit 
and receive modes. 




Number of users affects performance as the 
medium is shared. 
 
Some applications may be more demanding 









As distance between the AP and the client 
increases, data rate drops. 
 
Performance could be affected by the 
orientation of the client depending on the 
location of the antenna and also location of 
the AP. 
Table 8.   Key Performance Factors that Affect Throughput and Coverage (From Intel 
& IBM, 2004) 
A rather common functional constraint from either the tactical or the 
technical aspect of the system is the reliability that both the network has to provide and 
the participants have to present through their professionalism and dedication to the scope 
and the mission of the MIO. 
e. Effects to Be Measured - Criteria  
The criteria matrix will help in narrowing down the feasible solutions of a 
problem in general, providing the framework within where the solutions fulfill the 
functional constraints for the total or part of the design variables. Thus, by adapting a 
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criteria matrix (see Table 9) the planner will be able to determine the importance 
(weighting factor) of some of the variables, taking into account the goals and objectives 
of the system. 
Criteria Description Units 
Force effectiveness Provides the productivity of 
the force relative to the area of 
operation, the number of 
available units and the level of 
training 
Number of incidents that were 
completed per time unit (day-
week-month) 
Complexity of task Determines the level of 
complication that the specific 
task requires (i.e., compliant 
or non compliant boarding 
etc.) 
High–Medium-Low 
Time urgency Presents the level of urgency 




Nature of risk Determines the level of risk of 
the operation 
High–Medium-Low 
Economy of forces  Presents the optimization of 
the utility of the units 
High–Medium-Low 
Latency Determines the minimum 
acceptable time delay of signal 
receiving  
Time (sec-msec) 
Quality of situational 
awareness 
Determines the quality of the 
information that was gathered 
relative to the time that was 
collected and the results that 
produced 
High-Medium-Low 
Average throughput The averaged achieved 
throughput 
Bps 
Packet loss Indicates the “threshold” that 
we set as acceptable number of 
packets that might be lost 
without significantly 
degrading the quality of the 
signal 
Percentage  
Table 9.   Criteria Matrix 
f. The Pareto Set 
The multi-criteria analysis provides the methodology and the techniques 
for the scrutiny of the components that constitute a system through the holistic approach 
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of systems theory. Thus, the combination of different variables, constraints and criteria 
offer a variety of results that determine the area of potential solutions, but not necessarily 
the most optimal (R. Statnicov, Bordetsky, & A. Statnicov, 2005).  
In an effort to optimize the utilization of the feedback loops for efficient 
management of the system as a whole, the author requires the assistance of the Pareto set. 
Therefore, the Pareto set as a negotiation set that compromises the design variables, the 
functional constraints and the criteria in order to determine the optimal solutions is the 
most appropriate tool. Within that framework, the constant modifications and adjustments 
of the system underline the ad hoc nature and its dynamic behavior. 
In addition, the Pareto optimal solution satisfies the end user’s perception 
of quality, exploiting the mechanism that feedback loops generate by conducting 
continuous improvements to the process serving the self-organized behavior of the 
mobile ad hoc networks.   
Consequently, the combination of the multi-criteria analysis and the Pareto 
set makes available to both the MIO commander and network manager supportive tools 
that improve their decision-making processes and thus ameliorate the performance of the 
system as a whole, which is the genesis of this research effort. 
2. Planning the Experiment 
a. Environment 
For the purpose of this paper the author selected the geographic area of the 
Aegean Sea as the environment where the MIO tactical network is deployed, due to its 
important characteristics. The sensitive nature of this area contains the Southeastern edge 
of the European Union and the cross-point between the continents of Europe, Asia and 
Africa where the first is a stabilization factor and the later are significant areas of tension. 
Thus, the selected environment fulfills the criteria of a checkpoint for the control of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), smuggling, human and drug 
trafficking, illegal distribution of nuclear products and/or weapons, etc.  Within that 
framework, the exploitation of an adaptive, collaborative tactical network topology 
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facilitates information and knowledge sharing that improves the decision-making process 
of the MIO commander. The real-time connectivity between the nodes of the network 
eliminates the distance between subject matter expert (SME) groups and boarding teams 
that most of the time conduct and operate at geographically dispersed areas.  
b. Tactical and Technical Hierarchical Structure 
In an attempt to briefly present the hierarchical structure of MIO from the 
tactical-organizational point of view, the following tree diagram underlines the tactical 
relationships among the participants of the network. 
 
Figure 8.   Tactical Hierarchy of the MIO Structure 
In addition, each one of the MIO units has to comply with national rules 
and restrictions to the mission that reflect national policy on sensitive issues related to 




On the other hand, the topology of the network demonstrates its hierarchy, 
like the following example where the NOCs (network operation centers) represent hubs 
that monitor the traffic and collect, analyze, and process the data in order to maintain 
uninterrupted and high-quality services.  
 
Figure 9.   MIO Network Topology 
c. Network Components and Relationships 
The building blocks consist of nodes that are comprised of various 
individuals (local authorities, Coast Guard representatives, ship owners, etc.), teams 
(boarding teams, “mothership” crews, staff officers, etc.), and organizations (civilian, 
military).  The links are defined as communication channels that are connected for a 
particular duration of time, utilizing a particular technology platform, and may be 
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counted in terms of the number present in an adaptive network topology over a particular 





















































Figure 10.   Radiological Interdiction and Command Center Communications (After 
Bordetsky et al., 2009) 
Therefore, according to the above figure, the planner can maintain two 
NOCs, one at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and another one locally positioned at 
the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Training Center (NMIOTC) in Suda Bay, 
Crete, Greece. The two NOCs are interconnected in order to exchange real-time 
information for the sake of building integrated recognized maritime pictures (RMP) that 
exploit the assistance of subject matter experts that are stationed many thousands miles 
away from the theater of operations. Upon completion of the environmental settings of 
the experiment the planner needs to set the parameters that govern the model.    
d. System’s Description 
The experimental model’s network framework consists of two clusters of 
nodes where each node is a naval unit and each cluster is a group of three to four of the 





networks (LANs). Thus, each LAN has its own LAN manager responsible for the 
connectivity and quality of service (QoS) that is provided among the participants, 
meaning ship to ship or ship to shore or ship to boarding teams’ communications, etc. 
Both of the LANs are connected and exchanging data with the land-based headquarters 
located at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Center (NMIOTC) in 
Crete, Greece. The local authorities, the RadHaz (Radiation Hazard) experts, etc. 
constitute a LAN under the control of the LAN manager of the NMIOTC who also acts as 
the wide area network (WAN) manager, monitoring and controlling the subordinate 
clusters of the naval units that operate under the NMIOTC’s command. Then, this land-
based cluster will be directly connected through SATCOM (Satellite Communications) 
links with another cluster that contains all the required participants at the NPS according 
to the existing experience gained by the tactical network topology/MIO (TNT/MIO) 
series of experimentation (Bordetsky, Dougan, & Nekoogar, 2006). 




Figure 11.   Discovery Experimentation Topology 
At that point, it is essential to differentiate the technical part of the 
experiment from the tactical one, where the organizational structure of the MIO 
hierarchy, as it has been presented earlier in this paper, determines the relationships and 
the chain of command among the participants of the system as a whole.  
As already stated, the goal is the identification of the proper feedback 
loops, which can help the network performance within the spectrum of the functional 
constraints by operating in the best way. Thus, the processed information will be shared 
with the potential generation of new knowledge that eventually will flow among the 
participants of the network. Consequently, the flow of knowledge will affect the decision-
making process, which is the requirement at the tactical and technical domain of this 
experiment. 
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At this stage, the establishment of a well-bounded experimentation routine 
and the determination of a clearly defined set of requirements in the pre-experimentation 
phase will allow the planners to identify any issues early enough and avoid any latter 
inconvenience. 
e. Hypothesis Testing Experiments  
The generation of hypothesis scenarios moves the author to the hypothesis 
testing phase of the campaign of experimentation, where the planners of the experiment 
will be able to discover the limiting conditions and/or test a proposed theory within the 
framework of the design variables (independent) under the prism of the functional 
constraints (dependent) and the criteria set (control mechanisms). Through the “if…then” 
method they will be able to isolate any factor of interest and test it, producing new 
knowledge based on the observed behavior of that factor. 
The hypothesis testing experiments are formulated through the control and 
manipulation of the factors of interest. 
For the purposes of this experiment, an example of the “if… 
then…when…” technique would be the following: 
(1)  Operational Approach.  If information sharing occurs then 
group situational awareness increases when the scope and the mission of the MIO is 
clearly defined by the upper level of command and understood by all lower levels of 
participants. In addition, 
If all participants contribute evenly and continuously then the 
sufficient coverage of the area of responsibility increases when coalition members and 
organizations share the same feelings about the importance of the MIO mission.  
Through the above statements, one can clearly recognize the 
hierarchical relationship among the members of the MIO system and the role that the 
feedback loops play in the building of the shared situational awareness among the 
participants of the network. Moreover, it is required for the successful evolution of the 
operations that all the participants maintain a shared vision of the scope and objectives of 
the mission.   
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(2)  Technical Approach.  If data exchange is conducted without 
any interruption then network performance increases when the bandwidth and its related 
throughput are sufficient enough to allow the continuous data traffic. 
Furthermore, if the number of nodes per cluster increases then 
network performance increases when the nodes are equipped with similar and compatible 
technology that provides more alternative routing paths and handles any failure incident 
more effectively. At that time the causal loops provide the data that is required for 
maintaining or even increasing the quality of service in order to ameliorate the network 
performance. 
The specific goal of the campaign of experimentation will be to 
explore and exploit the impact of the causal loops on network performance. To this end, 
the planners are looking for networking and situational awareness solutions for 
interdicting, searching, tagging, and monitoring large vessels or small crafts that can 
threaten the security of the coastal areas, or be part of a transition network of the illegal 
distribution of radiological, nuclear, chemical or other subsequent products in an effort to 
eliminate any terrorist activity in the vicinity of the Eastern Mediterranean.  
The situational awareness goals of the experiment is the 
exploitation of any feedback mechanism capable of increasing the broad interagency 
collaboration and information sharing, using the existing capabilities of the naval and 
land-based units that participate in the network. In addition, the involvement of 
SATCOM technology will give planners the flexibility of extending the local capabilities, 
which will provide a universal profile by connecting the NMIOTC and the adjacent 
organizations and authorities with subject matter experts and other related agencies 
located across the ocean.   
These feedback loops can be achieved with the establishment of 
two-way data sharing techniques like the CENETIXS SA4 Observer Notebook or the 
Office Groovy5 tool, which can both build a common recognized maritime picture (RMP) 
that collects and exchanges data that can be analyzed and produces information based on 
                                                 
4 CENETIXS SA: NPS's Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation Situation Awareness. 
5 For more information, see the official site of Microsoft. 
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the explicit and tacit knowledge of the participants. Sequentially, that information might 
generate new knowledge upon the techniques or the means that the potential terrorists use 
in order to be distributed among the collaborating agencies of the network ameliorating 
their shared situational awareness.  
Additionally, the real-time exchange of data and information can 
be achieved by the implementation of video streaming technology using any video 
teleconferencing facility that connects instantly and more interactively the participants of 
the network. Another equally useful tool that was successfully implemented at the 
CENETIXS labs is the situation awareness (SA) viewer,6 where alarms and messages can 
be exchanged and presented on the actual locations that are produced through the 
collaboration with the Google Earth applications.  
All the solutions mentioned above can easily be exploited either at 
a local level, meaning among the members of each one of the clusters that constitute the 
under experimentation network, or between nodes from different clusters, or even from 
the system as a whole. With all that in mind, one can maintain not only the shared 
situational awareness but also monitor and control the behavior of the network at each of 
its stages: locally, regionally, and globally. 
Furthermore, network monitoring tools like SolarWinds7, 
DopplerView8 and others in conjunction with the above-mentioned collaborative systems 
can enhance any network management decision model implemented to support the 
quality of service standards.  
Most network management architectures use a similar basic 
structure and set of relationships among their agents. End stations (managed devices), 
such as computer systems and other network devices, run software that enables them to 
send alerts when they recognize any kind of fault or configuration problems (for example, 
when one or more user-determined thresholds are exceeded). Upon receiving these alerts, 
 
                                                 
6 More information can be received through the official site of CENETIX/NPS 
(http://cenetix.nps.edu/cenetix)  
7 More information can be received from the official site (www.solarwinds.com) 
8 More information can be received from the official site (www.kratosnetworks.com) 
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network monitoring tools are programmed to react by executing a series of actions, 
including operator notification, event logging, system shutdown, and automatic attempts 
at system repair.  
Management entities can also poll end stations to check the values 
of certain variables. Polling can be automatic or user initiated, but agents in the managed 
devices respond to all polls. According to Cisco’s “Internetworking technology 
handbook,” the agents are software modules that first compile information about the 
managed devices in which they reside, then store this information in a management 
database, and finally provide it (proactively or reactively) to management entities within 
network management systems (NMSs) via a network management protocol (Cisco, 
2009). 
Well-known network management protocols include the Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Common Management Information 
Protocol (CMIP) (Subramanian, 2000). Management proxies are entities that provide 
management information on behalf of other entities. Figure 12 depicts a typical network 
management architecture.  
 
Figure 12.   Typical Network Management Architecture Maintains Many Relationships 
(From Cisco, 2009)  
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Within the spectrum of this experiment and for the constraints’ 
analysis phase of the experiment, the author has to make a number of assumptions based 
on the measures of the reach-back’s performance, the MIO collaborative behavior and the 
network performance as a whole. 
Following are some of the parameters:  
• Ability of the boarding party to maintain connectivity with 
their mother ship and/or the local and regional commander. 
• Speed and accuracy of the radiation detection analyses. 
• Access time for mobile units (boarding teams) and 
synchronization with all sites.   
• Time and feasibility considering the mobile nature of the 
target. 
• Reliability and quality of experience that determines the 
received quality of the video (remote site observation). 
• Rapid decision-making process, which is required for the 
boarding party members in order to proceed to the next step 
in the process. 
• All team members have sufficient knowledge and 
familiarity with the employed technology that eliminates 
time issues when dealing with complex situations and 
developing common SA among the participants. These 
technologies include ultra wide band (UWB) 
communications for exchanging data files and pictures, as 
well as any other received evidence (radiation detection 
material) for overcoming any shortcomings of the 
narrowband communications systems in heavy metallic 
environments inside ships. 
• Ability to establish reliable mesh-links (ship to ship and 
ship to shore) by all participants. 
• Recognizing performance variations as a function of 
geography, geometry, range and electronic interference 
environment due to the uniqueness on the structure of the 
small naval units. 
According to Hazen (2003), the key problem in modeling the war-
fighting effectiveness of applications (network centric or not) lies in linking the local 
effects of the application to engagement/scenario measures of effectiveness. Thus, the 
role of the feedback loops operationally, and the causal loops technically, under certain 
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conditions and functional constraints determined by the environment and the nature of the 
mission in addition to the coalition profile of the participants (resulting the variation on 
the device standardization), underlines their necessity to the overall performance of the 
network as a system. 
The following two-stage approach is required:  
1. Determine the local effects of the application on 
“engagement” parameters by calculating measures of 
performance (MOP) for the application 
2. Use an appropriate engagement model to link the MOP 
inputs to engagement/scenario measures of effectiveness 
(MOE). 
When systems are vaguely understood, analysis is often conducted 
by starting with a parametric evaluation of stage two in order to develop an understanding 
of the warfare operation. The understanding thus developed can then be used to suggest 
and develop specific concepts or equipment (Hazen, 2003). 
3. Demonstration Experiment  
The testbed contains an expanding set of domestic and overseas remote command 
and tactical centers with global reach-back capabilities and rapidly deployable self-
forming wireless clusters. From the systems theory standpoint, the NPS-TNT testbed 
(which gathers many similarities with the proposed experiment) represents a unique 
research service of social and information networking.  It provides for the adaptation and 
integration of processes between people, networks, sensors, and unmanned systems 
(Bordetsky, Dougan, & Nekoogar, 2006).  
Upon the completion of this experimentation process, a demonstration of the 
knowledge that has been created, based on the results that the planners and executers 
received from the causal effects of the network, will prove the validity and credibility of 
the initially stated assumptions within the framework of the existing hypothesis tests. 
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4. Define Fidelity and Control Balance of the Experiment 
a. Fidelity Criteria 
Fidelity measurement has increasing significance for evaluation, treatment 
effectiveness research, and service administration. The dynamic nature of fidelity criteria, 
their appropriate validation and statistical analysis methods, along with the inclusion of 
structure and process criteria in the fidelity assessment, has a significant gravity for the 
validity and credibility of both the experiment and its results. Further attention to the use 
and refinement of fidelity criteria is important to the evaluation practice (Mowbray, 
Holter, Teague, & Bybee, 2003).  
For the purposes of this experiment, some of the fidelity issues that the 
planners have to consider are the following:  
• Scenario background details within the framework of the current 
operations.  
• The expected quality applications from the end users. 
• The level of collaboration among the different participating units. 
• The selection criteria for the team composition of the system. 
• Networking capabilities of the geographically dispersed units. 
• Bandwidth requirements for tactical operations with respect to the 
realism of the geography of the experiment and the number of 
participating units. 
• Reliability and bandwidth constraints of communication links 
among the units. 
• The quality of experience that characterizes the subject matter 
experts who are responsible for the analysis of the data and 
contribute to the decision-making process. 
b. Control Mechanisms 
The proposed optimal solution will have to introduce sufficient network 
management through the utilization of feedback loops, maximizing the overall 
performance in terms of connectivity and quality of the network as a whole. Throughout 
the experimentation process there is a big trade-off between openness that mobile agents 
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offer and security and safety, which are highly appreciated issues especially within the 
military environment that embraces MIO missions as well.  
Therefore, a series of control mechanisms is required to ensure the 
validity, credibility and reliability of the experiment, setting the boundaries through 
which the planners will manipulate the appropriate design variables (independent) within 
the framework of the functional constraints (dependent) under the prism of the 
optimization criteria. 
An approach of defining those mechanisms would be the listing of all the 
restrictions that apply to the operational environment, like the different national caveats 
that each of the participating nations within the coalition have or the operational 
limitations of the participants due to the variation of the type and capabilities of the units. 
Furthermore, the quality of the provided services relative to the limitations that the 
location of the nodes produces, in addition to the cost and logistics management of the 
operation, determine the control mechanisms’ network. Thus, the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of any MIO mission are dependent upon these variables.  
Similarly, the throughput capacity of the communication channel and the 
network’s load can provide the metrics of the network’s performance according to the 
number of participants and the level of the quality of service.  
C. EXPERIMENTATION SUMMARY 
The existing literature and experimentation history that is related to MIO 
describes and analyzes the behavior of the network from its technical aspect. In addition, 
the military doctrines recognize the difficulties of such operations and determine certain 
procedures for the successful completion of them. However, many times the requirements 
set by the network manager in order to achieve and maintain a high level of network 
performance are outside of the operational boundaries of the MIO commander. 
Furthermore, there are certain circumstances where the MIO commander requires the 
extension of the mesh network (i.e., during the chasing of a suspect) without the ability to 
add more units, thus nodes, to the network as a whole. Therefore, neither the prior nor the 
latter can achieve the highest of their expectations for the accomplishment of their duties. 
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Thus, the objective of this proposed campaign of experimentation is to combine these two 
collaborative domains, the tactical/operational and the technical, for the amelioration of 
network performance handling the system as an integrated entity.  
In addition, the increased shared situational awareness and the knowledge flow 
will assure the improvement of the decision-making process for both the MIO 
commander and the network manager.  
The author believes that a potential change in the working culture might be a good 
start, in order for the MIO commander and the network manager to understand the 
difficulties and the idiosyncrasies that both of them face from a different approach, every 
time that they have to cooperate under the same scope but with different (and sometimes 
controversial) supportive means.  
The necessity for uninterrupted and reliable exchange of data among all the 
participants will provide the ability for processing information that SMEs can upgrade 
due to their knowledge and experience. Thus, generating knowledge will result in more 
knowledgeable personnel, which will improve the performance of all the participants at 
the tactical level supporting the decision-making process of the MIO commander. In 
addition, it will also improve the network performance, due to the fact that better 




As the final chapter of this research effort the author will attempt to present a 
number of conclusions that are derived either from the literature review of the dynamic 
knowledge and decision-making realms or from the expected results of technical/tactical 
experimentations that test and investigate the interrelation between knowledge and 
decisions within the military environment of MIO. Furthermore, the author will 
emphasize the role that IT plays in the decision-making process in an effort to trigger the 
interest of the reader for further research   
Information systems’ technology plays an increasingly important role in the 
processes that add value to raw materials, whether they are in the traditional sense 
animal, mineral, vegetable, or even ideas (Hayes-Roth, 2006).  
Wealth and power have always been closely interrelated, with significant capital 
being necessary to obtain the instruments of power (weapons and armies). Today’s world 
is, in some ways, a far more dangerous place because more players can afford the 
investments needed for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terror. The affordability 
of WMD is reaching a level where they are no longer the exclusive property of nation 
states. They can now be increasingly found in the arsenals of terrorists, financed by rogue 
states or even wealthy individuals.  
The advent of information systems that support the decision-making process 
exacerbates the problem. The tools and techniques of information wars are even less 
expensive and more widely available than the traditional WMD. Moreover, the havoc 
they could wreak is not yet fully understood. Imagine what would happen if tanks, 
planes, ships, and munitions could be copied and distributed like software. The platforms 




Information technologies have proven to be revolutionary not only in the nature of 
the capabilities being developed in the information domain and the pace of these 
advances, but also in promoting discontinuous changes in the way individuals and 
organizations create effects, accomplish their tasks, and realize their objectives, thus, 
creating knowledge that requires some form of action. 
Information gathering, analysis, and decision making are activities on the critical 
path of one’s actions. Advances in information age concepts and technologies are 
compressing that process cycle time. These changes in the dimensions of time and space 
are increasing the pace of events, or operating tempo, in many different environments. 
A commander who makes and implements sound decisions faster than his/her 
adversary, while operating within his/her opponent’s decision and execution cycle, 
increases the relative tempo of operations and leverages his/her capabilities in 
maneuverability and firepower. In time, this ever-increasing advantage in relative combat 
power can prove decisive. Revolutionary advances in the technologies of surveillance, 
communications, information processing, and weapon systems are increasing the pace 
and reach of warfare exponentially. Future warfare will take place in an expanded 
battlespace, characterized by rapid, simultaneous, and violent actions across all 
dimensions—air, land, sea, undersea, space, time, and the electromagnetic spectrum. 
A commander is connected to his/her subordinate commanders by a command 
and control system that collects, processes, disseminates, and protects information. 
Additionally, the commanders use information to support decision making and, through 
subordinate commanders, extend their dominance over the forces of the adversary. 
Despite today’s complex infrastructure of systems and technology, command is 
inherently an intensely human activity. The element of personal leadership in naval 
command, for instance, never should be discounted. 
Moreover, a commander commands by deciding what must be done and 
exercising leadership to inspire subordinates toward a common goal; he/she controls by 
monitoring and influencing the action(s) required to accomplish what must be done.  
 
 85
Feedback is a vital element of control, as it gives the commander a way to monitor 
events, adapt to changing circumstances, adjust the allocation of resources, and 
harmonize the efforts of the force; thus, it improves his/her initial decisions. 
The research described in this paper builds upon and extends current theory 
pertaining to knowledge flow and focuses, in particular, on investigating its dynamics to 
inform the design of information systems and business processes. In addition, the author 
provides some of the already existing applications (VIRT, ForceNet) and/or proposed 
architectures (Smart Pull/Push) in an effort to trigger the interest of the reader for further 
research and potential discovery of the most suitable for his/her scope applications.  
In today's demanding military environment the key to success is to know first, and 
therefore act first and best protect one's interests while being able to manipulate the 
adversaries’ decisions. Highly placed decision makers around the globe have noted the 
greatly increased pressures upon them to react quickly to breaking events, often first 
finding out about these potential crises, not from their traditional sources, but from the 
news media. It is ironic that the information age, which on one hand provides vastly 
increased capabilities of collecting and processing data that makes it possible to make 
better decisions more quickly, is—on the other hand—reduces the time available to make 
decisions. Thus, the race is on. People need to either find ways to respond more quickly 
with quality decisions or find ways to extend the time for critical decisions by expediting 
other parts of the process. Technology provides proposals for potential supportive 
solutions. Whoever gets behind this race loses the game of competitive advantage. 
From now on, our digital infrastructure, the networks and computers we 
depend on every day should be treated as a strategic national asset that 
adds value to our intellectual capital. (White House, May 2010) 
Future commanders and directors need to have both the technical capability and 
the ability to communicate issues like cyber warfare and information dominance so that 
people understand and have trust and confidence that the gained knowledge and strategic 
vision of a nation is properly handled and correctly managed. Because cybersecurity is a 
fairly new concern, there is little known about what would constitute a ‘cyber war’. One 
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of the critical realities that come with cybersecurity is how extensively the cyber domain 
and the physical world intersect, and what the consequences can be to national security if 
officials are ill-prepared for an attack. 
Today, one of the bigger challenges is to find ways to make the work factor for an 
attack by sophisticated adversaries much larger, thus tipping the scales in favor of the 
defender through robust, resilient systems built on a solid foundation and that can support 
dynamic defense.  
As the tactics and capabilities of potential adversaries evolve beyond the 
traditional battlefield, the military should remain vigilant in maintaining an information 
edge through education, training and awareness in the information superiority fields that 
will drive that vigilance. The struggle for operational advantage will be an ongoing one, 
with enemies and strategies constantly changing. The one certainty is that there will be no 
turning back for the commitment of the military to maintain dominance in the 
information domain. 
Drawing on Leavitt (1965) and others, new IT needs to be integrated with the 
design of the process it supports. That is, the organization, people, procedures, culture 
and other key factors need to be considered in addition to technology. Given that many 
knowledge management projects now revolve around IT implementation (e.g., 
intranets/extranets, Web portals, groupware) (Nissen et al., 2000), re-engineering and 
knowledge management even appear to be sharing some of the same mistakes. 
For the naval commander, naval intelligence is a form of knowledge that helps 
build a picture of the situation as it exists now and how it may exist in the future. As 
people gain knowledge they begin to see the relationships between events in the 
battlespace, fathom the way an enemy thinks, and project what he/she might do. More 
importantly, at this level people begin to recognize some of the things that will forever 
remain unknown, and thus identify the uncertainty they must deal with. However, in 
general, the lower the echelon of command, the faster and more direct decision making 
can be. An individual unit commander can normally base decisions on factors that he/she 
observes firsthand. At successively higher echelons of command, commanders are further 
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removed from events by time and distance. Consequentially, in a well-trained force 
imbued with initiative, the lower that the decision-making threshold can be pushed, the 
swifter the decision and execution cycle will become. 
Successfully conducting operations requires access to information available 
outside the operational area. Information infrastructures no longer parallel traditional 
command lines, and war-fighters need frequent, instant, and reliable access to 
information at their headquarters as well as in theater. Mobility and sustainment of forces 
are highly dependent on commercial infrastructures that include international 
telecommunications, the public switched network, commercial satellites and ground 
stations, transportation systems, and electric power grids. Joint forces require secure 
video teleconferencing; data base connectivity, direct downlink, and broadcast/receive 
capabilities for reachback access to intelligence, logistics, and other essential support 
data. The technical complexity and management of these information infrastructures 
could inhibit a commander’s ability to control the flow of information or dynamically 
manage available information and telecommunications resources (JP-3-13). 
The networking of knowledgeable entities enables them to share information and 
collaborate to develop shared awareness, and also to collaborate with one another to 
achieve a degree of self-synchronization. The net result is increased combat power. For 
example, the principle of ‘on the offensive’ is to act rather than react and to dictate the 
time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. This is all about battlespace 
awareness, speed of command, and responsiveness. The application of network-centric 
concepts has enormous potential for improving people’s ability to achieve battlespace 
awareness, speed of command, and force responsiveness. 
While predicting human and organizational behavior will remain well beyond the 
state of the art, having a better near real-time picture of what is happening (in situations 
where this is possible from observing things that move, emit, etc.) certainly reduces 
uncertainty in a meaningful way. The author would argue that better battlespace 
awareness and increased responsiveness could help people shape the battle to their 
advantage. 
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It is really about exploiting information to maximize combat power by bringing 
more of the available information and war-fighting assets to collaborate, both effectively 
and efficiently. Thus, the development of collaborative working environments for 
commanders and for all war-fighters (soldiers, sailors, and airmen) will make it easier to 
develop common perceptions of the situation and achieve self-coordinated responses to a 
variety of complex situations. Therefore, there is definitely a challenge for automated 
tools and decision aids on the battlespaces of the future. There are different types of 
decisions to be made, and different tools and approaches to these decisions are 
appropriate. 
Across a broad range of activities and operations, the time required by individuals 
to access or collect the information relevant to a decision or action has been reduced by 
orders of magnitude, while the volume of information that can be accessed has increased 
exponentially. Consequently, across a broad range of value-creating activities, the 
fundamental limits to the velocity of operations are no longer governed by space or time. 
Instead, the fundamental limits are governed by the act of deciding, by the firings of 
neurons and by the speed of thought which is merely the time that network-centric 
concept works. 
Increased awareness of emerging technology will also contribute to leveraging 
technology to make all of the activities in the value chain more effective and efficient, 
thus reducing costs and risks. The ability of an enterprise, organization or service to share 
information across functional areas can enable resource allocation decisions to be made 
that maximize value from an overall enterprise perspective rather than a purely functional 
perspective. This ability gains a significant value today, within the continuously 
increasing global financial crisis that exists. 
Moreover, as time is being compressed, the tempo of operations is being 
increased.  Therefore, the cumulative impact of better information, better distribution, 
and new organizational behavior provides services with the capability to create 
information superiority. This creates less uncertainty for the decision maker and more 
knowledgeable entities (individuals or groups), which dominate at the battlespace. 
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Information age organizations achieve domination of their ecosystems by 
developing and exploiting information superiority. This research paper presents the 
concept of dynamic knowledge in military operations and examines the changes in the 
operating environment, or competitive space of military organizations, and the emerging 
capabilities that affect people’s ability to understand and influence this competitive space 
recognizing the significant support that information technology offers to this direction. 
If one looks at these changes as a whole, it is clear that current missions have 
become far more complex and the challenges, as well as the adversaries, less predictable. 
Organizationally, people deal with three distinctive but interrelated levels—the strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Geographically, they deal with sectors or theaters, and 
functionally, they usually deal with specific jobs or tasks in a sequential manner (e.g., 
first comes the suppression of enemy air defenses and achieving air superiority, then 
attacking other targets is next). The battlespace is thus segmented and one can deal with 
smaller isolated problems, tasks, or battles. The nature of information age warfare makes 
it more and more difficult to operate in this challenging and rather unknown environment. 
The near real-time sharing of information within the enterprise provides decision makers 
with a common operational picture that helps facilitate self-synchronization, as well as 
increase the tempo and responsiveness of operations. 
For a successful present and a promising future, all nations and military 
organizations have to know how to get desired results for their goals. They have to know 
how to assess their situation in a fast and reliable manner, develop credible plans, 
anticipate the results their plans will produce, implement plans, control execution, 
observe outcomes, learn from experience, innovate and continually improve. In 
aggregate, these activities define what Dr. Rick Hayes-Roth (2006) introduces as 
“efficient thought” (p. 29). What matters most is the ability of the decision maker to 
achieve good outcomes in a dynamic environment by rapidly and correctly understanding 
the current situation and its potential evolution. Thus, having the ability to formulate, 
evaluate, and implement integrated plans and execute them faster than agile adversaries, 
the decision maker occupies the competitive advantage that offers the final victory.  
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The modern era has created an environment where collaborative decision making 
can be employed to increase combat power. This is partly because of the emergence of 
coalition operations, partly because of the distribution of awareness and knowledge in the 
battlespace, and partly because of the compression of decision timelines. This alone 
would be challenging enough, but the information age has also transformed the problem 
of warfare from a series of static events to more continuous ones by greatly increasing the 
operating tempo of events. The result is the need for greater integration between the 
heretofore separate planning and execution processes, which requires more timely 
interactions between the two, and portends an ultimate merging of these two processes 
into a seamless form of command and control. 
Therefore, reality has changed the way one reaches decisions, allocates decision 
responsibilities within the organization, develops options and evaluates them, and the 
manner in which one chooses among them. This has obvious implications in how one 
designs systems and trains people, which becomes the necessity for more in-depth 
analysis for their causes.  
The technological evolution affects decisions, discovers or generates new areas to 
invest in, and requires more knowledge that develops a self-reinforcing cycle of research. 
To this end, it is also true that the continuous race for more knowledge, which decreases 
the uncertainty, subsequently forces people to rely even more on the technology that 
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